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DISCRETION, DELEGATION, AND DEFINING IN THE 
CONSTITUTION’S LAW OF NATIONS CLAUSE 
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ABSTRACT—Never in the nation’s history has the scope and meaning of 
Congress’s power to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of 
Nations” mattered as much. The once-obscure power has in recent years 
been exercised in broad and controversial ways, ranging from the Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS) to military commission trials in Guantanamo Bay. Yet it 
has not yet been recognized that these issues both involve the Offenses 
Clause and indeed raise common constitutional questions. First, can 
Congress “define” offenses that clearly already exist in international law, or 
does it have discretion to codify debatable or even nonexistent international 
law norms? Second, what happens to this discretion when it delegates the 
power to a coordinate branch? 
This Article shows that the Offenses Clause allows Congress only to 
“define”—to specify the elements and incidents of—offenses already 
created by customary international law. It does not allow Congress to create 
entirely new offenses independent of preexisting international law. At the 
same time, the Framers understood international law to be vague and 
intertwined with foreign policy considerations. Thus, courts reviewing 
congressional definitions should give them considerable deference. 
Moreover, whatever discretion Congress has in defining offenses disappears 
when it broadly delegates that power to another branch, as it has in the 
ATS. The Supreme Court suggested a similar standard for ATS causes of 
action in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. Appreciating the role of delegation in 
the ATS shows that the limits on offenses that can be litigated under the 
statute have a constitutional dimension. 
The Article develops the original understanding of the Offenses 
Clause—particularly important given the lack of any judicial decisions on it 
in the nation’s first century. It draws on previously unexplored sources, 
such as early cases about the meaning of the “define” power in the cognate 
context of “piracy and felonies,” legislation by early Congresses, and 
discussions by Framers like Madison and others. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Never in the nation’s history—at least not since the Neutrality and 
Alien Acts debacles of the 1790s—has the scope and meaning of 
Congress’s power to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of 
Nations”1 mattered as much. The once-obscure and seldom-used power2 has 
in recent years been exercised in controversial ways, ranging from civil 
human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), to military 
commission trials in Guantanamo Bay, to the historic prosecutions being 
conducted against Somali pirates in federal courts. Yet it has not been 
recognized that these issues all raise similar constitutional questions under 
the Offenses Clause. 
 
1  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. This Article will refer to this as the “Offenses Clause,” and the 
entire provision in which it is found as the “Define and Punish Clause,” or “Clause Ten.” 
2  See J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against 
the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 847 (2007) (“Among Congress’s powers, there is probably 
none less understood or subject to such widely varying interpretations . . . .”); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign 
Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1273 n.185 (1999) (describing the Clause as 
“obscure”). 
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This Article sketches the limits of Congress’s power to define offenses. 
Furthermore, it examines the reach of the power when Congress delegates 
authority to define offenses to other branches. The former analysis has 
significance for the current military commission litigation, where the 
defendants argue that the crimes they are charged with fall outside 
international law and thus Congress’s define power. The delegation issue 
has even greater implications for the ATS. In the statute’s interpretation by 
the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the power of federal courts 
to define international law causes of action themselves was the central 
issue.3 The Supreme Court is poised to significantly revisit the ATS in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., an effort that should be informed by 
an awareness of the constitutional backdrop to the statute.4 
The Offenses Clause’s new relevance comes in the wake of 
unprecedented, yet unheralded, developments in Offenses Clause 
jurisprudence. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld5 was the first case ever to find the 
government exceeded its Offenses Clause powers.6 This historic aspect of 
the case has been overlooked (including by the Supreme Court itself), 
perhaps because the case was mostly noted for its more newsworthy rebuke 
of the Bush Administration’s Guantanamo policies.7 Yet since Hamdan, the 
Offenses power has played a central role in the ongoing proceedings before 
the military commissions.8 
Hamdan’s military commission and ATS litigation cases raise the same 
two questions about the scope of the Offenses power.9 First, can Congress 
“define” only offenses that clearly already exist in international law, or does 
it also have discretion to codify debatable, embryonic, or even nonexistent 
norms? Second, what happens to whatever discretion Congress has to 
“define . . . Offences” when it delegates that power to a coordinate branch? 
This Article will explore both of these questions. 
 
3  542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
4  621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
5  548 U.S. 557, 611–12 (2006) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (holding that “conspiracy” to commit 
war crimes is not a violation of international law and thus could not be punished under the exercise of 
the Offenses Clause). 
6  See Charles D. Siegal, Deference and Its Dangers: Congress’ Power to “Define . . . Offenses 
Against the Law of Nations,” 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865, 880 (1988) (noting that no Offenses 
power measure has ever been judicially invalidated). 
7  See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5–3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2006, at A1 (“The decision was such a sweeping and categorical defeat for the 
administration that it left human rights lawyers who have pressed this and other cases on behalf of 
Guantánamo detainees almost speechless with surprise and delight . . . .”). 
8  See infra note 315 and accompanying text. 
9  These questions have also been raised in the ongoing Somali piracy prosecutions, which involve a 
related provision in Clause Ten, the power to define “piracies . . . on the high seas.” See, e.g., United 
States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 624 (E.D. Va. 2010) (holding that the definition of piracy under 
the statute “could only keep pace with, and not force, international consensus”). 
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The commonality of the Offenses Clause questions presented by 
military commissions and the ATS has not been generally recognized. Yet 
both situations involve what courts have treated as delegated exercises of 
the Offenses power.10 The military commissions in Hamdan exercised the 
Offenses power and various war powers,11 and Congress explicitly invoked 
its Offenses Clause authority in subsequently enacting the Military 
Commissions Act (MCA), which defined some of the offenses rejected in 
Hamdan.12 Though there is no legislative history for the ATS, courts have 
generally regarded it as Offenses Clause legislation13 since the statute 
directly borrows the constitutional language.14 As it happens, the Offenses 
 
10  To be sure, in the ATS, the delegation of the power to define the law of nations is to the courts for 
civil suits, while in military commissions the delegation is to the Executive for criminal proceedings. 
11  See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30 (1942) (holding that the military commissions were 
authorized by Article 15 of the Articles of War, in which Congress “exercised its authority to define and 
punish offenses against the law of nations”); see also United States v. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557, 592 & 
n.22 (2006) (identifying sources of legislative authority for Guantanamo as the “substantially identical” 
successor provision to Article 15); Stephen I. Vladeck, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 295, 323, 329 (2010) 
(showing how Hamdan left undisturbed Quirin’s identification of the Offenses Clause as the Article I 
basis for commissions). 
12  See Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948–950); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). In the appeal of Hamdan’s 
military commission conviction, the Government significantly changed its characterization of the 
constitutional basis for the provisions punishing material support of terrorism. The Offenses Clause was 
claimed as “an additional basis” for the law, Brief for the United States at 47–48, Hamdan v. United 
States, No. 11-1257 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2012), 2012 WL 136259, at *47–48, with the principal reliance 
placed on the “power to punish offenses traditionally tried before military commissions pursuant the 
[sic] U.S. common law of war,” a part of the penumbra of war powers, Jens David Ohlin, Conspiracy 
and the New Hamdan Argument, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 16, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/ 
02/16/conspiracy-and-the-new-hamdan-argument (“In the past, it was widely assumed that 
Congressional enactment of the Military Commissions Act was based on [the Government’s] 
constitutional power to define and punish violations against the law of nations.”). 
13  See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“[The ATS] 
presumably is based upon Congress’ power . . . to ‘define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of 
Nations.’”). The seminal ATS case cited the Offenses Clause as a “possible” basis for the ATS, but did 
not decide the issue. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Edward T. 
Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1528–29 (2004). 
14  The constitutional authority for the ATS ultimately depends on whether the statute is substantive 
or jurisdictional, a point left murky by the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692 (2004). See infra text accompanying notes 37–39. Both parties to the suit framed the ATS as an 
exercise of the Offenses power. See Brief of Petitioner at 8, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 
162761, at *8; Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 8, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 
(No. 03-339), 2004 WL 182581, at *8. However, the Supreme Court in Sosa did not conclusively 
identify the source of constitutional authority. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717. The plurality opinion could be 
read to indirectly point to Article III alienage jurisdiction as a constitutional basis. Id. The opinion 
briefly discusses the preconstitutional concerns about the lack of a clear national power to deal with 
violations of international law and mentions Article III’s alien diversity provisions, but not the Offenses 
Clause, as the Framers’ response. Id. at 716–17. Still, most of the Founding Era background that the 
plurality discusses is widely regarded as inspiring the Offenses Clause. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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Clause has cross-cutting political implications for the MCA and the ATS. A 
narrow Offenses power would limit military commissions, to the delight of 
those on the left, but would also constrain ATS litigation, a bête noir of the 
right.15 
Determining the existence and content of international norms should 
presumably be similar for all exercises of the Offenses power, whether the 
ATS or the MCA.16 Yet it does not always play out this way. Many scholars 
take a broad view of corporate and aiding and abetting liability for 
international law violations under the ATS, despite the lack of judicial 
precedents.17 Yet scholars did not take a similarly generous view of 
 
Had the Court found the statute purely jurisdictional, Article III would be a logical basis, and it 
would be hard to understand the ATS as Offenses legislation (though it would help account for the 
omission of the ATS from lists of offenses laws by early commentators). But since the Court held that 
the statute created or authorized causes of action and allowed new ones to be recognized, Article III 
could hardly suffice. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25. Since courts have continued to treat the ATS as 
fundamentally substantive in the wake of Sosa, the Offenses Clause remains the natural Article I basis 
for the authority to do so. 
15  Both the confusion about the nature of the Offenses power and its complex political implications 
are illustrated by amicus briefs submitted by scholars in two different cases. In an amicus brief in 
support of the Violence Against Women Act, some scholars argued for a broad understanding of the 
power. Some of the same amici argued for a narrow view of the Offenses Clause in a subsequent brief 
dealing with offenses established by Guantanamo military commissions. (The author of this Article was 
among the amici in the latter brief.) The positions are not necessarily contradictory but are clearly in 
tension. Compare Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law Scholars and Human Rights 
Experts in Support of Petitioners at 19–20, Brzonkala v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-0005, 
99-0029), 1999 WL 1037253, at *19–20 (arguing that Congress can “define” conduct that is not a 
“direct [violation] of the law of nations” but is simply something that “the United States is required to 
prevent under international law”), with Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting 
the Petitioner’s Constitutional Arguments at 21, Hamdan, No. 11-1257 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 2011), 2011 
WL 5871046, at *21 (“Congress’ power under the Offenses Clause is limited to imposing sanctions on 
existing violations of international law, and does not include the power to create new international law 
norms. As a result, Congress had no power under the Offenses Clause to create a military commission to 
prosecute Salim Ahmed Hamdan for offenses that were not violations of existing norms of international 
law.”). 
16  This Article takes no position on whether these laws exercise the Offenses power. Both certainly 
have other constitutional roots, which in many ways provide a more natural basis for the respective 
legislation. This Article treats military commission and alien tort cases as Offenses power issues because 
that is how courts and commentators have approached them. Even if one or both of these statutes were 
not an exercise of the Offenses power, general notions of comity and predictability in statutory 
interpretation would suggest that federal courts go about identifying the content of international norms 
(at least absent a specific definition by Congress) using the same process and standards across statutes 
that incorporate international law, such as the military justice statute implicated in Hamdan, the ATS, or 
the federal piracy statute. 
17  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Constitutional Rights, International Human Rights 
Organizations and International Law Experts in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. July 13, 2011), 2011 WL 2743195, at *5–6; Brief of Amici Curiae 
International Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 17–35, Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Dec. 21, 
2011), 2011 WL 6780141, at *17–35. Some of the scholars who argue that international law supports 
corporate liability did file amicus briefs in Hamdan’s support, though on other issues. See Brief of Amici 
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conspiracy or material support for terrorism as a basis for war crimes 
liability in the Hamdan proceedings. In Hamdan, numerous academic amici 
argued that there was no precedent in international law for the conspiracy 
charges, but this group of amici did not join the briefs arguing against 
corporate liability in the ATS cases.18 The Nuremberg Trials provide an 
excellent example of the different standards applied to similar bits of 
international legal evidence. The tribunals did have a conspiracy charge, yet 
legal scholars argued in Hamdan that this was not enough of a precedent to 
find that such a theory of liability existed in international law.19 On the other 
hand, Nuremberg did not have corporate liability, yet in ATS cases, 
scholars write that this does not mean the Nazi war crimes trials do not 
support the existence of such a theory.20 In short, the tribunals’ decisions are 
said to support ATS corporate liability (despite being formally silent on the 
matter) but not MCA conspiracy, despite allowing such charges. 
While there has been a recent uptick in academic interest in the long-
neglected Offenses Clause,21 the analysis of the Clause’s substantive scope 
has largely consisted of passing comments in work devoted to other 
questions, such as who can be punished,22 how individuals can be 
punished,23 and where individuals can be punished.24 These discussions 
 
Curiae Professors of Legal History Barbara Aronstein Black et al. in Support of Petitioners at 16–23, 
Kiobel, No. 10-1491 (U.S. Dec. 21, 2011), 2011 WL 6813563, at *16–23. 
18  Amicus Curiae Brief of Specialists in Conspiracy and International Law in Support of Petitioner 
(Conspiracy—Not a Triable Offense) at 2–3, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 
2006 WL 53979, at *2–3; Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Constitutional Rights in Support of 
Petitioner at 3–5 & n.5, Hamdan v. United States, No. 11-1257 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 
5871045, at *3–5 & n.5 (arguing that conviction under Military Commissions Act should be thrown out 
because the offenses defined by Congress do not violate international law). 
19  See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez in Support 
of Petitioner-Appellee Salim Ahmed Hamdan and Affirmance of the Decision of the District Court at 
12–19, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5393), 2004 WL 3050179, at *12–
19. 
20  See Brief of Amici Curiae Nuremberg Scholars Omer Bartov et al. in Support of Petitioners at 3–
4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 10-1491, 11-88 (U.S. Dec. 21, 2011), 2011 WL 6813570, 
at *3–4. 
21  This Article is a sequel to an earlier piece on the other half of the Define and Punish Clause, the 
piracies and felonies power. See Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits 
of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2009) [hereinafter Kontorovich, Define and Punish]. 
22  See Kent, supra note 2, at 852 (arguing that the Clause authorizes Congress to take measures 
against sovereigns as well as private individuals). 
23  See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and 
Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 454 (2000) (arguing 
that the Offenses Clause allows for civil, not just criminal, legislation and authorizes Congress to act in 
areas of traditional state concern). But see Michael T. Morley, Note, The Law of Nations and the 
Offenses Clause of the Constitution: A Defense of Federalism, 112 YALE L.J. 109, 113 (2002). 
24  See Zephyr Rain Teachout, Note, Defining and Punishing Abroad: Constitutional Limits on the 
Extraterritorial Reach of the Offenses Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 1305, 1331 (1999) (arguing that “the reach 
of the Offenses Clause [should] be limited by the jurisdictional principles of customary international 
law”). 
106:1675 (2012) Law of Nations Clause 
 1681
have only cursorily addressed the fundamental questions of what constitutes 
“defining” and what constitutes “offenses.”25 
One can sketch two polar positions about the scope of the Offenses 
power. In the maximalist view, the Offenses Clause gives Congress broad 
latitude in identifying putative international norms to incorporate into 
domestic law.26 This latitude could, in practice, be limitless. As one district 
court speculated, Congress could “arguably” use the Offenses power to 
regulate any conduct that is “recognized by at least some members of the 
international community as being offenses against the law of nations.”27 
Others take the opposite view that Congress is strictly limited to specifying 
the elements of clearly established international law offenses.28 The second 
question—what happens when Congress delegates the defining—has almost 
entirely escaped attention, although most significant exercises of the 
Offenses power involve wholesale delegation.29 
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the 
substantive scope of the Offenses Clause. It considers a variety of 
significant originalist evidence missing from earlier scholarship, especially 
 
25  But see Siegal, supra note 6; Howard S. Fredman, Comment, The Offenses Clause: Congress’ 
International Penal Power, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279 (1969); Note, The Offences Clause After 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2378 (2005). 
26  See Stephens, supra note 23, at 545 (“[I]n deciding what falls within the reach of the Clause, 
Congress’s decisions are entitled to significant deference from the judiciary.”); Note, supra note 25, at 
2394 (arguing that the “fluid, self-reinforcing character of modern customary international law and the 
role Congress has in shaping international law” requires that Congress not be confined to defining 
clearly established offenses); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 335 & n.51 (suggesting that while “Congress presumably does not have unlimited 
power to declare something a violation of the law of nations,” the courts will give it considerable 
flexibility); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 
118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1808–10 (2009) (arguing that the “Clause confers on Congress a very broad range 
of interpretive judgment to say what international law is”). 
27  United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dictum) (emphasis added). 
28  See Siegal, supra note 6, at 879 (arguing that it would “extend the clause too far to permit 
Congress to use it to define offenses without a clear international law basis”); Stephens, supra note 23, 
at 474 (“The debates at the Constitutional Convention made clear that Congress would have the power 
to punish only actual violations of the law of nations, not to create new offenses.”); see also Sarah H. 
Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2006) (“International law plays a 
robust role in [the Offenses Clause] context, supplying the substantive rule against which Congress’s 
constitutional authority is measured.”); Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s 
Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1219–23 
(2009) [hereinafter Kontorovich, Beyond Article I]; Jules Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality 
Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
1, 16 n.86 (1983) (“[I]t would seem unlikely that the Convention meant to give Congress the power to 
make new international law” or to go “beyond the law of nations at the time,” and thus the “more 
sensible reading is that . . . the use of the term ‘define’ was necessary to provide Congress with the 
power to give sufficient precision to a rule of nations so as to make it adequate for criminal 
prosecution.”). 
29  But see Note, supra note 25, at 2397–98 (suggesting courts have less power to define offenses 
than Congress does because of foreign policy implications). 
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textual and contextual comparisons of the define power to analogous 
constitutional powers, a comprehensive examination of all of the Offenses 
Clause legislation passed by early Congresses, and post-ratification views 
of such luminaries as James Madison and Daniel Webster. The Article 
examines how the authority to “define” was understood in relation to the 
other two powers in Clause Ten to which it applies (piracies and high seas 
felonies), both at the Convention and in the early Republic. Finally, the 
Article addresses the implications of Congress delegating the define power 
to another branch, as it has in all of the currently controversial uses of the 
power. 
While the Article focuses primarily on textual/structural and originalist 
indicators of meaning, the conclusions do not depend on fidelity to any 
particular interpretive approach. Interpretation of the Offenses Clause is 
originalist almost by default—there is only one major Supreme Court case 
on the issue, written a century after the adoption of the Constitution and 
with a rather elliptical discussion of the fundamental constitutional 
questions.30 
The Article’s conclusions about the scope of Congress’s powers are 
mixed. The originalist evidence strongly supports the view that Congress 
can define only offenses that already exist in international law. Unlike other 
grants of power in Article I, Section Eight, the Offenses power is backward 
looking, allowing Congress to codify offenses already established in 
international law rather than participating in what international lawyers call 
“the progressive development” of international norms. However, 
congressional definitions should receive a fair degree of deference from the 
courts when, as will often be the case, the existence or details of the 
underlying international norms are substantially unclear. 
These two conclusions are in tension but are not contradictory. 
Congress gets its margin of error or discretion, not because the define 
power is a creative one, but because of the inherent vagueness and 
indeterminacy of international law and the leeway the political branches 
generally command in their conduct of foreign relations. Congress cannot 
codify made-up international law, but what is real is unusually subjective in 
this area. 
The most contentious exercises of the Offenses power involve no 
actual definition provided by Congress, but rather a wholesale delegation to 
other branches. Here the conclusions of the Article are stronger.31 First, the 
breadth of the delegation in the ATS is troubling. The statute leaves it to the 
courts, without any statutory guidance, to identify and adopt causes of 
 
30  United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887) (holding that statute criminalizing foreign 
banknotes was a legitimate exercise of the Offenses power); see infra Part III.A. 
31  The two principal constitutional questions this Article explores are conceptually distinct: the 
delegation analysis does not depend on accepting the conclusions about the overall scope of defining 
offenses. 
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action for torts in “violation of the law of nations,” a scope which echoes 
the Article I grant itself.32 Such a broad delegation requires a clear limiting 
principle, and restricting definable offenses to those clearly established in 
international law serves this function. Moreover, none of the possible 
reasons for giving judicial deference to congressional definitions apply 
when it is the other branches doing the defining in the first place. 
A few more words should be said here about the ATS, the statute for 
which the analysis in this Article may have the most relevance, given the 
wide-ranging discretion courts exercise under it to define diverse putative 
international law violations. Adopted by the First Congress as part of the 
Judiciary Act and then ignored for 190 years, the ATS gives district courts 
“original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”33 In 1980, the Second Circuit, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
reanimated the statute as a tool for international human rights litigation in 
U.S. federal courts.34 Filartiga inspired a significant debate that centered on 
which of the ATS’s two phrases should govern the statute’s reach. Some 
argued, as the ATS’s first phrase suggests, that the statute is purely 
jurisdictional.35 Others focused on the second half, which seems to provide 
a substantive cause of action for violations of the law of nations, or at least 
recognize such causes as they had already existed in common law.36 The 
Supreme Court addressed that matter in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which 
confusingly adopted a hybrid of the substantive and jurisdictional views.37 
According to Sosa, the statute allows courts to craft causes of action, not for 
any “violations of the law of nations,” but only for a “modest set of 
actions.”38 These would include the three offenses incorporated into 
common law in 1790 and, additionally, a limited set of new customary 
international law offenses that had an equally “definite content and 
 
32  For a discussion of possible limits built into the ATS, see infra note 354 and accompanying text. 
33  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). Most scholars assume “the law of nations” referred to by the ATS (and 
the Offenses Clause) to be synonymous with what is today known as customary international law. But 
see Morley, supra note 23, at 113 (arguing that the “law of nations” refers to natural law concepts that 
“exclude[] wholly domestic conduct that does not have a direct effect on foreign nations or nationals”). 
34  630 F.2d 876, 889–90 (2d Cir. 1980). 
35  William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation 
of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 479–80 (1986). 
36  See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the 
“Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 237 (1996); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–19 (2004) (noting the “considerable scholarly attention” devoted to the 
question of what, if any, causes of action the ATS created). 
37  See Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About 
the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 118, 122 (2004) [hereinafter 
Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa] (observing that, “[l]ike Santa Clause, the Court’s opinion brought 
something for everyone,” managing to endorse at least three out of four competing theories of the 
statute’s scope). 
38  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720. 
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[universal] acceptance among civilized nations” as the historical 
benchmarks.39 Not surprisingly, Sosa did little to settle the ATS 
controversy. Courts and commentators now debate whether the Sosa 
standard is supposed to be restrictive or permissive.40 Did the opinion, as the 
Court promised, leave only a narrow opening for judicially fashioned 
causes of action, or was it “hardly . . . a recipe for [judicial] restraint”?41 
Would it, for example, allow for causes of action for less pedigreed 
international offenses, like environmental degradation or child labor? 
This Article shows that a strong version of the standard articulated in 
Sosa—limiting ATS causes of action to the most universally agreed-upon 
norms with elements clearly defined in the law of nations—is not only an 
internal requirement of the ATS but also an external one, imposed by the 
Constitution itself. However, Sosa described its insistence on caution and 
vigilance as derived from mere legislative intent and prudential 
considerations. This Article shows how this same conclusion follows from 
the nature of the Offenses power when Congress fails to define but rather 
delegates its powers to the courts without any intelligible principle to guide 
their discretion. The constitutional source for limiting ATS actions is 
important in that it raises the stakes. Courts risk exceeding the federal 
government’s constitutional powers when they recognize offenses not 
extremely well-established, and universally and clearly defined in 
international law. Determining whether particular causes of action that have 
been recognized in ATS suits have clear support and precedent in 
international law, similar to what was required in Hamdan, would require a 
detailed analysis beyond the scope of this Article. However, several cases 
have recognized causes of action with little or no precedent in international 
justice.42 
Part I lays the groundwork by outlining the questions about the 
meaning of the Offenses Clause that will be discussed and some possible 
positions that have been suggested, as well as explaining why the Offenses 
Clause still matters in an age of nearly unlimited Article I powers. Part II 
seeks answers to these questions in the original meaning of the Clause, as 
revealed by its historical background, drafting history, the actions of early 
 
39  Id. at 715, 732. 
40  Compare Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa, supra note 37, at 156 (arguing that Sosa’s historical 
test implicates criteria that most modern customary international law norms fail to satisfy), with Ralph 
G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of 
International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2255 (2004) (noting that 
in Alvarez-Machain, the court “repudiate[d] the revisionist view of international law according to which 
ATS human rights actions were intrinsically illegitimate”), and Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain: “The Door Is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 
535 (2005) (describing Sosa as supporting prior human rights litigation under ATS). 
41  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729; id. at 748 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
42  See infra notes 364–70 and accompanying text (listing questionable offenses recognized in ATS 
suits). 
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Congresses, and other tools. Part II begins by explaining why even those 
not normally interested in the textual or original meaning of the 
Constitution would be interested in the original meaning of the Offenses 
Clause and develops this meaning. Part III goes on to examine the few 
times the Supreme Court has addressed the question of limits to the 
Offenses power. The first and primary of these cases came 100 years after 
ratification, and the approach the Court took is at some odds with the 
understanding of the Clause developed in Part II. Part III shows how, while 
the Court’s initial encounters with the Offenses Clause showed considerable 
deference to defined offenses, Hamdan took a markedly different approach, 
rejecting a defined offense for inconsistency with what it saw as objective 
international law. Part IV addresses the distinct issue of delegated defining, 
which helps explain how Hamdan’s rigorous inquiry is consistent both with 
earlier cases and the original meaning. It shows that open-ended delegations 
of the Offenses power are problematic given the policies behind the Clause, 
as well as general nondelegation principles. Even if Congress gets some 
leeway in its substantive definitions of offenses, this discretion does not 
apply to nonlegislative “definitions.” This final Part briefly touches on 
implications for major questions in ATS litigation, such as the range of 
permissible causes of action and the permissibility of corporate liability. 
I. LIMITS ON THE POWER TO “DEFINE” 
Discussions of the Offenses Clause often conflate a variety of issues 
concerning its scope. This Part first carefully identifies four separate but 
related questions and the range of answers that have been suggested. The 
second section then explains why any of this matters—how there can still 
be legislation that could not be parked in some other Article I location. 
Those interested in skipping the preliminaries are encouraged to proceed 
directly to Part II. 
A. Possible Positions 
Because possible limits on the Offenses power have generally been 
discussed only in passing, there is some confusion about the possible issues 
involved, and several separate but related questions often get conflated. 
There are two main issues addressed in this Article (each of which consists 
of two subissues)—how broadly can Congress regulate via the Offenses 
Clause, and how should courts approach congressional exercises or 
delegations of this power? As one commentator recently put it, the 
unresolved Offenses Clause questions are: “[H]ow much leeway does its 
‘define’ power give to Congress [to legislate new norms] and what type of 
scrutiny will the courts give to its definitions?”43 The first question—about 
 
43  Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: Constitutional Limits on Their Role in the War on 
Terror, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 573, 585 (2008). 
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the substantive scope of the power—has two subparts, which can be 
thought of as the Clause’s domain and range. The first is what we will call 
the “define” question—what is the precise nature of this power, as 
distinguished from more obviously plenary powers like the ones to “make” 
laws or “regulate” a field? Both narrow and broad understandings have 
been mooted by scholars in the past few years. In the narrow view, the 
“power . . . might extend only to the definition, rather than the creation, of 
such offenses,” and thus can only be used to codify crimes over which there 
is a clear “international consensus.”44 This understanding of what conduct 
can be regulated under the Offenses power sounds very much like the 
Court’s test for what conduct can be reached by the judiciary through the 
ATS. The opposite view was recently sketched by Michael Stokes Paulsen: 
“Congress is not constrained in the exercise of its Law of Nations Clause 
legislative power by ‘customary’ international understandings of customary 
international law. Congress’s views can be broader, narrower, or simply 
different.”45 In the first model, international law provides a limited 
inventory of norms from which Congress can pick, with some adaptations 
and domestications, presumably. In the second model, Congress can 
develop or willfully interpret international practices, and not just passively 
receive them. 
The second subquestion goes to what “Offences against the Law of 
Nations” refers to. Is it a narrow body of rules that have over time attained 
the universal assent of nations, or is it any matter that could conceivably be 
governed by such rules? This question is not entirely distinct or empirically 
separable from the prior one because the define power is fungible with 
“Offences”: Congress’s power under the Clause is a product of the 
robustness of its define power and the scope of the category of “Offences.” 
For example, if (to take an extreme position) any tort relating to foreign 
affairs can be an “Offence,” then it would be nearly impossible for 
Congress to adopt a definition that is out of bounds, regardless of how 
narrow the define power, and vice versa. As to the scope of “Offences,” the 
narrowest answer is that it refers to specific prohibitions established in 
international law that apply to individual conduct. 
“Offences,” however, can and sometimes has been taken to refer to 
increasingly broad concentric circles of regulatory power. This would allow 
the Offenses power to be used to: 
regulat[e] the conduct of individuals not [only] when that conduct violates 
customary international law by itself, but when the conduct could impinge on 
interests either required to be protected by international law (including 
 
44  Id. 
45  Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1809–10. 
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treaties), recognized as important by international law, or, at the least, related 
to the foreign affairs of the United States.46 
One version of this broader position that bears particular note because it has 
gained some credence in the courts is that “Offences” refers to conduct that 
may not be an internationally recognized crime on the part of the actor, but 
which gives rise to legal responsibility for redress by the United States. 
Turning to the courts, two separate questions arise. The first is the 
classic one of how much deference they owe to a congressional 
determination that something is an offense under the law of nations.47 This 
is the basic question of the appropriate standard of judicial review for the 
exercise of various constitutional powers. Again, here there is a range of 
views—from treating definitions as political questions to treating them no 
differently from any other question of law that courts can review de novo. 
In most recent Offenses Clause kerfuffles, there has been no legislative 
definition to defer to—Congress has delegated broadly to the courts. Thus, 
the second question about the Offenses Clause in the courts is what kind of 
latitude do they have in “defining” offenses? The answer to this question 
depends partly on the answer to the prior question about the extent of 
Congress’s permissible creativity—presumably the courts could have no 
more discretion in establishing offenses than Congress does. 
B. Continued Relevance of the Offenses Clause 
One might wonder whether the outer limits of the Offenses power have 
become moot as a result of the expansion of other Article I powers, such as 
the Commerce Clause. The classic commentators saw the Offenses power 
as significantly overlapping with the foreign commerce and war powers 
because breaches of international law by or against Americans can 
substantially affect dealings with other nations.48 Indeed, there has rarely 
been an explicit exercise of the Offenses power that might not have been 
sustained under some other legislative power.49 Yet the most controversial 
 
46  Kent, supra note 2, at 863 (footnotes omitted). 
47  See Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1776, 1808 (suggesting Congress has the last word on its 
“definitions” of offenses). 
48  See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1160, at 
57 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (stating that “[i]t is obvious, that this power has an intimate 
connexion and relation with the power to regulate commerce and intercourse with foreign nations” as 
well as war powers); 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 268–69 (Philadelphia, William Young 
Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (noting overlap between foreign commerce, war, and Offenses powers). 
49  See infra notes 165–99, 259–62 and accompanying text. When Congress has explicitly invoked 
the Offenses power in recent decades it usually did so, perhaps inaptly and certainly redundantly, for 
statutes implementing treaties to which the United States is party. See, e.g., War Crimes Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-192, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2104, 2104 (codifying certain violations of the Geneva 
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uses of the Offenses Clause today—the ATS and the terrorism crimes of the 
MCA—do have significant applications for which the Offenses Clause 
could be the only possible Article I basis.50 
The Foreign Commerce Clause is perhaps the broadest grant of 
authority over international matters, especially given the expansive post-
New Deal interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause. The former 
Clause is an obvious first place to look for an Article I backstop for dubious 
Offenses Clause legislation. Yet despite the required involvement of aliens 
as plaintiffs, some ATS cases involve conduct that falls outside of foreign 
commerce. 
For one, ATS offenses could involve acts that are essentially crimes or 
torts, which may not be “commerce” and cannot, without more, be 
regulated under the commerce powers.51 Secondly, the ATS has been 
widely applied to conduct with no U.S. nexus whatsoever52 (unlike the 
MCA).53 This application goes beyond the scope of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause as well. The Supreme Court’s sweeping interpretations of the 
 
Conventions); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) 
(codifying Convention Against Torture). 
50  This discussion leaves aside any possible inherent Commander in Chief authority the President 
may have for convening commissions and defining the conduct they prosecute. 
51  Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that federal civil remedies for 
violence against women cannot be regulated under the Interstate Commerce Clause). In practice, many 
or most ATS suits today involve the extraterritorial operations of large multinational corporations, not 
the wrongs of private individuals. Most corporations are either based in the United States or have 
extensive enough contacts for personal jurisdiction. Thus, these cases could easily fall within the foreign 
commerce power. See generally Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on 
Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 105, 109–10 (2005) (describing the increase in ATS lawsuits 
against corporations in the mid-1990s). 
52  Indeed, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, which launched modern ATS litigation, involved only 
Paraguayans and conduct only in Paraguay. 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980); see Donald Francis 
Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 142, 146 (2006). Recent human rights suits continue to use the ATS because until recently, no 
other country allowed for universal jurisdiction provision. See id. at 149; Eugene Kontorovich, 
Precedent-Setting Dutch Civil Universal Juris. Case, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 28, 2012, 11:38 AM), 
http://volokh.com/2012/03/28/precedent-setting-dutch-civil-universal-juris-case (discussing landmark 
Dutch case allowing universal jurisdiction suits for torture and the implications for the ATS cases before 
the Supreme Court). 
53  The jurisdiction of commissions only extends to forces hostile to the United States. However, the 
controversial “material support for terrorism” crime of the MCA is borrowed from an ordinary federal 
crime of the same name, which does not require a U.S. nexus. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), (d)(1)(C) 
(2006); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Congress expressed 
that it was enacting its prohibition on material support to foreign terrorist organizations pursuant to its 
power . . . to ‘define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations’ and thus appears to have 
recognized that providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization is a violation of the law of 
nations.”). This is also a controversial exercise of the Offenses Clause, as federal courts have found that 
there is no international consensus on the offense of terrorism. See United States. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 
56, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding no “international consensus on the definition of terrorism or even its 
proscription”). 
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interstate commerce power have not been paralleled in its foreign 
commerce power jurisprudence. While the former allows regulation of 
commerce “among” states, the latter applies only to commerce of the 
United States “with” a foreign state.54 At a minimum, the Foreign 
Commerce Clause requires extraterritorial conduct by foreigners to have 
some direct nexus with the United States.55 Any other interpretation would 
incongruously give Congress—which has limited domestic legislative 
powers—global regulatory carte blanche. 
Even Alexander Hamilton, the leading advocate of expansive federal 
power, argued that the foreign commerce power requires some American 
involvement in the regulated conduct: 
Congress . . . may regulate, by law, our own trade and that which foreigners 
come to carry on with us; but they cannot regulate the trade which we may go 
to carry on in foreign countries . . . . This must depend on the will and 
regulations of those countries; and, consequently, it is the province of the 
power of treaty to establish the rules of commercial intercourse between 
foreign nations and the United States. The legislative may regulate our own 
trade, but treaty only can regulate the national trade between our own and 
another country.56 
If, as Hamilton thought, the foreign commerce power could not reach trade 
conducted by Americans in foreign countries, the notion that entirely 
foreign trade fell within the power would be absurd. Thus, much ATS 
litigation—all universal jurisdiction cases and those cases that involve local 
crimes—would, in the absence of a treaty establishing jurisdiction,57 depend 
solely on the Offenses Clause.58 With the military commissions, the 
 
54  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
55  See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 954, 970–71 
(2010). For example, Congress can clearly punish someone who travels from the United States to a 
foreign country to engage in sex tourism. But Congress cannot directly legislate against foreign sex 
tourism by punishing, should they subsequently enter the United States, those who engage in it without 
having traveled from the United States. Thus, a Briton who travels to Thailand for sex tourism and later 
visits America cannot be constitutionally punished for the Thai activity, while an American resident can. 
See id. at 994–1003. 
56  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Camillus No. XXXVI, reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 501, 507–08 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1851). 
57  Even for conduct that violates international law, the Offenses Clause, at most, only authorizes 
federal courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes that have this status in international law. See 
generally Kontorovich, Define and Punish, supra note 21 (detailing the limits of universal jurisdiction 
under the Offenses Clause). In other words, the Offenses Clause requires that both the substantive and 
the universal jurisdictional status of the crime be drawn from the law of nations. See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761–62 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
58  The Treaty and Offenses Clauses separately address the two primary sources of international law. 
This dichotomy suggests that the Offenses Clause becomes relevant only when the United States is not 
party to a treaty that would authorize the relevant legislation. If there is a treaty, the question becomes 
whether it is self-executing or has been implemented by Congress. Judicial use of unratified or 
unlegislated treaties to establish ATS offenses thus seems problematic; though, to be sure, treaties can 
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Offenses Clause may be less crucial, as much of its powers could be 
necessary and proper to the regulation of the armed forces or Congress’s 
general war powers.59 However, the federal criminal counterpart to the 
commissions’ terrorist crimes may also have to depend on the Offenses 
Clause if it were applied to conduct with no U.S. nexus. 
II. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE OFFENSES CLAUSE 
This Part seeks to explain the scope of the Offenses power by 
examining the original meaning of the provision. This is not because of any 
commitment to originalism, and none is assumed on the reader’s part. To be 
sure, the relevance of the text and the original meaning of a constitutional 
provision is common ground to all major schools of constitutional 
interpretation.60 The Supreme Court focuses heavily on original sources in 
any discussion of a constitutional provision, particularly one that is 
otherwise poorly understood.61 
For the Offenses Clause, originalism is the principal tool available. The 
first Offenses Clause case was decided 100 years after the Constitution’s 
adoption in 1788,62 and the next case nearly 60 years after that.63 These 
cases took no note whatsoever of any original sources, in a way that would 
be surprising to modern jurists. As a result, the Court’s interpretation 
significantly departed from the Clause’s history and purpose, without any 
justifications given for this approach. Rather, the Supreme Court, in its first 
and foremost Offenses Clause case, seemed to think it was writing on a 
blank slate.64 Thus, with the Offenses Clause, the original meaning has not 
been foreclosed by a continuous path of jurisprudential development or a 
 
be evidence of custom under the Offenses Clause. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 181 
n.11 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Kent, supra note 2, at 863 n.75 (criticizing Congress’s conflation of treaty-
based and law of nations offenses in recent amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). See 
generally David H. Moore, Medellín, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic Status of International 
Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 495 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the doctrine 
of non-self-execution “thin[s] the evidence available to plaintiffs seeking to recover under the ATS for 
violations of [customary international law]”). 
59  See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing the 
overlapping authority between Congress’s power to authorize commissions for war crimes under its 
Offenses power, as it had done in Quirin, and the President’s separate Commander in Chief powers to 
create such commissions for other offenses); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942) (identifying military 
commissions as arising under the power to regulate the military); see also Vladeck, supra note 11; Ingrid 
Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683 (2009) (exploring the original history of the 
Clause). 
60  Cf. Kent, supra note 2, at 857–61 (discussing the examination of the original meaning of the Law 
of Nations Clause). 
61  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716–27 (1999) (looking to “original understanding” of 
Article III and the Eleventh Amendment). 
62  United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887). 
63  See Quirin, 317 U.S. 1. 
64  See Arjona, 120 U.S. 479. 
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multitude of contemporary precedents, as some have argued is true of other 
important Article I powers.65 
Originalism itself comes in many strands, such as original intent 
(focusing on the goals of the drafters) and the now more widely accepted 
original public meaning (focusing on the understanding of the general 
public at the time of ratification).66 Different brands of originalism place 
greater emphasis on different kinds of evidence; for the former, the debates 
at the Constitutional Convention are central, for the latter, dictionaries play 
a prominent role. Yet the different schools mostly vary in the weight they 
attach to these different sources rather than whether they regard them as 
relevant. Thus, the post-ratification views of Framers may be strong 
evidence of what they thought in Philadelphia, but they are also evidence of 
how an informed citizen might read the provision. Conversely, dictionaries 
are a powerful tool for illuminating public meaning, but given that, they are 
also relevant to the drafters’ intent. 
Because the search for original meaning in this Article is pragmatic, 
not programmatic, all strains of originalist evidence are reviewed. For ease 
of exposition, the materials are examined chronologically, not in order of 
evidentiary importance. We begin with the circumstances and policies that 
led to the inclusion of the Offenses Clause in the Constitution.67 This Part 
proceeds to examine the drafting history at the Philadelphia Convention. 
The drafting history is mostly important to original intent or expectations, 
as the proceedings in Philadelphia were secret at the time of ratification. 
Yet it is also an important source for original public meaning, as it 
explicitly shows the meanings at least some listeners attached to various 
nuances in the terms used.68 Perhaps most importantly in this case, the 
central considerations that drove the word choice at the Convention were 
publicized by Madison at various points in the ratification process.69 
 
65  See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 852–53 (2009) (citing post-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence as an 
example). 
66  See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 13–19 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Papers Series, Working Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 
(describing modern history of originalist approaches). 
67  The background circumstances and problems with the Confederation to which the Philadelphia 
Convention responded were part of the context within which both the drafters and their audience would 
understand the plain meaning of their words. See id. at 52–54. 
68  Original public meaning does not, to be sure, involve either summing or sampling 
contemporaneous audiences. It is better understood as what a reasonable man would take the semantic 
meaning of the words to be. See id. at 51. Open discussions of the point in question by presumably 
reasonable men is certainly informative to recreating the hypothetical reasonable man. 
69  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (explaining that the defining power is needed 
because of the vagueness and indeterminacy of the bodies of law to be defined); James Madison in the 
Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
331, 332 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand]. 
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The Part goes on to examine sources crucial to understanding the 
original public meaning, including the scant mentions of the provision in 
the state ratification debates. More can be learned about the original 
semantic meaning from dictionaries and parallel constitutional provisions. 
Finally, this Part will examine the legislation adopted by early Congresses 
that could have been justified as an exercise of its Offenses Clause power. 
Congress used the Offenses power to enforce only the most well-
established crimes of the times and rejected using it to implement otherwise 
attractive proposals to regulate conduct that was on the cusp of international 
culpability. 
A. The Articles of Confederation 
The Articles of Confederation did not contain any reference to offenses 
against the law of nations.70 However, the nation immediately felt the need 
for a federal power to deal with violations of international law. Compliance 
with international law was a particular concern for the new country because 
it needed to establish its legitimacy and could ill afford reprisals or renewed 
war. The international law violations foremost on the Framers’ minds were 
the oppression of foreign creditors and property owners (particularly British 
ones) by state governments, and violence against foreigners and foreign 
officials.71 
1. Responses to Offenses in the 1780s.—The former concerns were 
addressed in the Constitution by the foreign commerce power and the 
Supremacy Clause’s reference to treaties (most saliently, the Treaty of 
Peace with Britain). Violence against foreigners in the United States was a 
direct violation of well-established customary international norms, which 
had been adopted into the common law of England. However, concerns 
about the nation’s ability to respond to such violations were crystallized in a 
minor, but at the time sensational, assault on François Barbé-Marbois, the 
French minister, in Philadelphia in 1784.72 The incident led to considerable 
discussion about the enforcement of international law in the new nation.73 
The Articles of Confederation gave Congress no power to deal with such 
violations, and so the response to the assault was left to Pennsylvania state 
 
70  The Articles did, however, give Congress exclusive power to “appoint[] courts for the trial of 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art IX, para. 
1. 
71  Mob violence against British nationals was a particular problem. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & 
Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 501–02 
(2011). 
72  Few if any constitutional provisions are so directly attributed to a particular incident as the 
Offenses Clause. See Siegal, supra note 6, at 874; Stephens, supra note 23, at 466–68; Fredman, supra 
note 25, at 287–88. 
73  Another incident involving an attempted arrest of a member of the Dutch minister’s staff in 1787 
also caused concern. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 71, at 467. 
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courts.74 The Commonwealth’s legal system worked well—the offender was 
convicted and sentenced to jail—and there was no indication that the 
Pennsylvania courts were xenophobic.75 However, it was noted with some 
concern that when French leaders raised the Marbois issue with federal 
officials, the former were surprised to learn the matter was out of the latter’s 
control.76 
Some American statesmen worried that there were no particular 
provisions in state law for protecting diplomats or otherwise incorporating 
international law.77 In the wake of the Marbois incident, Pennsylvania and 
Virginia passed legislation extending special protection for foreign 
ministers.78 But leaders in other states worried that similar incidents might 
not be as fairly resolved elsewhere. As Madison wrote to James Monroe in 
1784: 
Nothing seems to be more difficult under our new Governments than to 
impress on the attention of our Legislatures a due sense of those duties which 
spring from our relations to foreign nations. Several of us have been labouring 
much of late in the G[eneral] Assembly here to provide for a case with which 
we are every day threaten’d by the eagerness of our disorderly Citizens 
for . . . Spanish blood.79 
Yet well before the Marbois episode, Congress understood the 
weakness of the Articles with regard to offenses against the law of nations.80 
A 1781 report to Congress by a committee comprised of Edmond 
Randolph, James Duane, and John Witherspoon expressed concern that 
foreign relations difficulties might arise because state law did not 
“sufficiently” provide “regular and adequate punishment . . . against the 
transgressor.”81 The report recommended that states pass laws to ensure the 
punishment of the three major international crimes that were incorporated 
into English common law.82 The report also suggested that since violations 
 
74  See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 113 (Pa. 1784). 
75  See Alfred Rosenthal, The Marbois-Longchamps Affair, 63 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 
294, 298–99 (1939). 
76  Cf. id. at 300 (“It has never been easy for other powers to understand the nature of our federal 
system.”). 
77  While the Pennsylvania high court found that the law of nations “form[ed] a part of the municipal 
law of Pennsylvania,” Longchamps, 1 U.S. at 114 (emphasis omitted), the concern was that other states 
could conclude otherwise, see Kent, supra note 2, at 880 & n.177. 
78  See Rosenthal, supra note 75, at 299. 
79  Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Nov. 27, 1784), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 91, 93 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). 
80  Cf. Kent, supra note 2, at 874–80 (criticizing the conventional account that casts the Marbois 
affair as being a direct cause of the Offenses Clause). 
81  21 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 1136 (1781). 
82  See id. These included two of the three international crimes that had been incorporated into 
British common law, assaults on ambassadors and violations of safe conducts. The third, piracy, was 
already within Congress’s jurisdiction under the Articles of Confederation under Article IX. 
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of less “obvious” law of nations offenses might also endanger public safety, 
states should empower their courts to “decide on offences against the law of 
nations, not contained in the foregoing enumeration.”83 Additionally, the 
report suggested an avenue for civil redress, recommending that states 
“authorise suits . . . for damages” by “injured” foreigners.84 Only one 
state—Connecticut—appears to have adopted the kind of measures called 
for by the committee’s report.85 Yet the 1781 report clearly foreshadowed 
the Constitution’s Offenses Clause, which would simply give to Congress 
the powers that it had previously depended on the states to exercise. 
Given that the 1781 report left much of “the power to decide on 
offences” to courts, one might wonder why the Constitution gave the power 
to Congress; any scheme of legislation would address only the “most 
obvious” offenses.86 The answer probably lies in the more limited powers of 
the Article III judiciary as compared to state courts. Given the general 
common law jurisdiction of state courts, a criminal jurisdiction coextensive 
with customary international law would not be troubling. But, at the time, 
there was great controversy about the existence of federal criminal common 
law powers.87 
2. State Responsibility for Offenses in the Eighteenth Century.—An 
appreciation of some features of the late eighteenth-century views of the law 
of nations is helpful to better understand the Framers’ concern about a lack 
of central authority to address international offenses. This history will also 
help to clarify what the Offenses Clause means given subsequent changes in 
the law of nations. Under the law of nations as expounded by the eminent 
publicists of the eighteenth century, such as Emmerich de Vattel, nations 
could be held responsible for the injuries caused by their subjects to 
foreigners or powers.88 One of these offenses for which a nation could be 
held responsible was quite broad: violence or insult to a foreigner. If a 
citizen committed such an offense and the United States did not provide 
redress, the aggrieved state could, under the law of nations at the time, 
 
83  Id. at 1137. 
84  Id. 
85  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716 (2004). South Carolina also adopted a narrower 
statute focusing on protecting foreign ministers. Kent, supra note 2, at 881 & n.180. 
86  21 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS at 1137. 
87  Washington’s Neutrality Declaration, for example, assumed that crimes against the law of 
nations, at least where they threatened United States security, could be prosecuted in federal court under 
federal common law. See Kent, supra note 2, at 862 n.74. Yet the one effort to do so revealed strong 
opposition to the notion of federal common law crimes. See id. The 1871 report has also been 
understood as accepting that the class of punishable offenses could change over time. See Stephens, 
supra note 23, at 454. Although this may be true, it is not inconsistent with a static division of authority 
between state legislatures and courts over obvious and nonobvious offenses. 
88  See Bellia & Clark, supra note 71, at 471–77. 
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justify reprisals or even war.89 However, the actions required to disassociate 
a nation from responsibility for individuals’ acts did not have to amount to 
full-blown prosecution of the offending individual. The United States could 
fulfill its responsibilities by providing criminal punishment if the act took 
place within U.S. jurisdiction, extradition if requested and the offense were 
committed abroad, or compensation, apologies, and similar diplomatic 
satisfaction.90 
The notion of state responsibility for offenses by individuals presumes 
some primary conduct that, when committed by individuals, can trigger 
vicarious responsibility. That is, while the law of nations could broadly be 
said to have made states responsible for the offenses against foreigners, it 
still left open the question of what kind of injuries and offenses. The law of 
nations treated an action as an offense only when nations tolerated certain 
salient, intentional wrongs—“to plunder, and [maltreat] foreigners” or to 
invade neighboring countries.91 Thus, while neither torts of negligence nor 
violations of foreigners’ contractual rights, for example, would amount to 
offenses by individuals, the United States could still be held accountable for 
them. 
3. Implications for Theories of the Offenses Power.—One broad 
theory of the Offenses power interprets it as encompassing anything that 
triggers the international legal responsibility of the United States, or, even 
more broadly, anything that could lead to reprisal by a foreign nation, even 
if it does not arise from an individual’s direct violation of international 
law.92 However, the 1780s background to the Clause does not support such 
a broad reading of “Offenses.” Recall that there were two main international 
concerns in the 1780s—unfairness to British creditors and landowners and 
violence against foreigners.93 
The Framers responded to the concerns about foreigners’ property and 
contract rights with the treaty and interstate and foreign commerce powers. 
Indeed, foreign reactions to the Constitution were heavily focused on its 
implications for American compliance with the law of nations. Yet the 
Framers hardly mentioned the Offenses Clause, with their attention 
 
89  See id. at 476. It is crucial to note that two elements combined here: primary conduct by 
individuals that international law regarded as wrongful and the concept of “state responsibility” for that 
conduct. These two elements need not go together. One could have wrongful conduct without state 
responsibility (if the conduct occurred abroad). One could also have state responsibility without any 
individual offense, such as accidental damage caused by a government vessel. 
90  See id. at 474. 
91  2 EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS: OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE; 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS § 78, at 226 (1st Am. ed., 
Samuel Campbell 1796). 
92  See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 483 (1887). For example, even if an individual does 
not violate international criminal law by picketing a foreign embassy, the United States may run afoul of 
its international obligations if it allows such activity. 
93  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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focusing instead on various federal powers to control commercial matters.94 
This suggests the Offenses Clause was not regarded as a broad source of 
power against conduct obnoxious to other nations.95 
The 1781 committee report—the precursor to the Offenses Clause—
focused on the more sporadic problem of individual (and tortious) conduct, 
rather than economic harassment. This focus suggests the function of the 
Offenses power was not to respond to any acts that would violate U.S. 
duties to other nations, such as discriminatory state property laws; that was 
the job of the Treaty and Commerce Clauses. Rather, it dealt with a subset 
of international wrongs—those that involved criminal or tortious acts by 
individuals, which then triggered the legal responsibility of the United 
States. When the First Congress exercised the Offenses power, it was only 
over discrete individual delicts, themselves defined in the law of nations.96 
Subsequent early Congresses avoided using the Offenses power as a general 
means of suppressing conduct vexatious to other countries. The original 
purpose of federal punishment for offenses was to avoid the United States 
being held internationally responsible for the offenses of individuals, not to 
regulate private conduct that did not itself violate the law of nations but 
could cause international difficulties for the government. 
Professor Beth Stephens has argued that the Offenses Clause allows 
“Congress to regulate matters governed by international law.”97 This 
authorization would cover a far broader set of issues than those for which 
the United States would be held accountable. Indeed, such matters might 
not involve the United States at all, such as the treatment of foreigners by 
other countries.98 This position is hard to square with the 1780s background 
of the Offenses Clause. The committee report summed up the purpose of 
Offenses legislation: safeguarding the “public faith and safety” of the 
United States,99 that is, punishing breaches by individuals where doing so 
would be seen as the United States’ duty. This says nothing about purely 
permissive legislation within the broad ambit of the law of nations. In all 
 
94  See Daniel Hulsebosch, Being Seen Like a State: The American Constitution and Its International 
Audiences at the Founding (Feb. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
95  See David M. Golove and Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 
999–1000 (2010) (describing the Offenses Clause as “a minor provision” within the context of the 
Framers’ goal of allowing the nation to comply with international law and fulfill its international 
obligations). 
96  The Randolph proposal in the 1781 committee report recommended that the creation of a cause of 
action by the United States to recover “compensation to the United States for damage sustained by them 
from an injury done to a foreign power by a citizen.” 21 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 1137 (1781) 
(emphasis added). This suggests the Offenses power was concerned with matters within the international 
legal responsibility of the United States, so long as they arose from individuals’ violations of the law of 
nations (“injuries”), not simply when not remedied by the United States. 
97  Stephens, supra note 23, at 525. 
98  See id. at 461. 
99  21 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS at 1137. 
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cases contemplated by the Framers, the violations had to directly involve 
the United States.100 Because the United States could not be held 
accountable for the conduct of other nations, the purposes of the Offenses 
Clause fall far short of including universal jurisdiction over crimes with no 
U.S. nexus or any other conduct for which the United States does not bear 
international legal responsibility.101 
Professor Stephens’s broad view of offenses seems premised on the 
notion that the law of nations in 1789 dealt with only a few matters but has 
since expanded (as the Framers understood it might) to address a variety of 
issues distinct from individual misconduct; the scope of the Offenses 
Clause should expand concomitantly, she argues.102 Yet the law of nations 
in 1789 also concerned itself with many domestic issues in natural law 
terms—what would today be known as “soft law”—that were more 
sweeping than any modern human rights convention. As James Wilson 
wrote in 1791, “Opinions concerning the extent of the law of nations have 
not been less defective and inadequate . . . . A very important branch of this 
law—that containing the duties which a nation owes itself—seems to have 
escaped their attention.”103 He went on to catalog a variety of reflexive 
duties, including “know[ing] itself,” that stem from the law of nations.104 
Wilson, like many other Framers, drew many of his views on 
international law from Emmerich de Vattel’s Law of Nations, which 
considered, as a matter of natural law, every aspect of municipal law.105 
While there might have been in some sense a law of nations duty to “know 
oneself,” to “love and to deserve honest fame,” or to “avoid ostentation,” 
the violation of such a duty was not the kind of “Offence” the Constitution 
contemplates. The background to the Clause suggests that from the vastness 
of the law of nations, constitutional offenses would include only a subset of 
international norms—those norms for which, if violated, the United States 
could be held liable by a foreign nation. In other words, the purpose of 
“Offences” was limited to violations of duties to other nations. 
 
100  See Bellia & Clark, supra note 71, at 450–51 (arguing that the 1780s context also suggests that 
the ATS was only intended to reach international law offenses committed by Americans or in United 
States territory). 
101  Professors Bellia and Clark have reached similar conclusions about the scope of the “law of 
nations” in the ATS. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 71, at 451–53. This further underscores this 
Article’s thesis that since the ATS is one of the principal pieces of Offenses legislation and the statute 
directly incorporates the constitutional language, many of the limits on the ATS will come directly from 
the Offenses Clause. 
102  See Stephens, supra note 23, at 454. 
103  James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, Lecture on Law (1791), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 70, 72 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION]. 
104  Id. at 73. 
105  See 1 VATTEL, supra note 91, § 18, at 64 (“Since then a nation is obliged [by the law of nations] 
to preserve itself, it has a right to every thing necessary for its preservation.”). Obviously, the law of 
nature and of nations could conflict with the U.S. Constitution on these broad points. 
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On the other hand, the background to the Offenses Clause suggests that 
Congress’s definitions of offenses be given considerable leeway. For one, 
the Confederation Era concerns about foreign reprisals suggest it is less 
important whether the purported offense actually exists in international 
custom than if at least some foreign nations believe it exists. For avoiding 
reprisals against the United States by aggrieved countries, whether the 
offending conduct objectively constitutes an offense is not the central issue. 
Such a focus would counsel for some discretion in defining by Congress, as 
it would have to take into account how other nations interpret the law of 
nations, whether such interpretations are sincere, and so forth. Moreover, 
the 1781 committee report recommended that states deal with nonobvious 
offenses. If they are not obvious, then presumably there might be some 
disagreement as to whether they are offenses at all. If the Offenses Clause 
gives Congress the power the report had urged states to exercise, this would 
suggest such disagreements would be decided in Congress’s favor. While 
this does not necessarily mean Congress could define offenses willy-nilly, it 
might suggest less emphasis on demonstrable state practice in establishing 
an offense. 
B. The Constitutional Convention 
The entire Define and Punish Clause received only a cursory 
discussion at the Federal Convention, and only one brief exchange was 
devoted specifically to the offenses against the law of nations.106 The first 
version of the section appeared in a draft in the Committee of Detail, which 
authorized Congress: 
6. To provide tribunals and punishment for mere offences against the law of 
nations. 
7. To declare the law of piracy, felonies and captures on the high seas, and 
captures on land.107 
Here, the law of nations offenses got their own section, with maritime 
crimes and military measures grouped together in the subsequent one.108 
The committee draft notably gave no particular lawmaking power over 
offenses to Congress, but rather only contemplates the creation of courts.109 
 
106  See Stephens, supra note 23, at 474–75. 
107  2 Farrand, supra note 69, at 143; see also Kent, supra note 2, at 898 (discussing possible 
interpretations of the Committee’s draft). 
108  The draft was written by Randolph, and it transfers to the federal level the recommendation of 
his 1781 congressional report, which had called for “a tribunal in each State . . . to decide on offences 
against the law of nations.” 21 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 1137 (1781). 
109  This followed the Articles of Confederation, which gave Congress the power of “appointing 
courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and establishing courts for 
receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of capture.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 
1781, art. IX, para 1. Interestingly, the “declare the law” power in the first draft is applied to the offenses 
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Presumably, the drafters entertained the notion that such offenses might be 
punished to some extent as federal common law crimes, as George 
Washington subsequently sought to do in his Neutrality Proclamation.110 
The committee ultimately took another route, perhaps due to 
misgivings about common law crimes. It reported a text that gave Congress 
the power “to declare the Law and Punishment of Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas, and the Punishment of counterfeiting the 
[]Coin[] []and[] []of the U.S. &[] of Offenses against the Law of 
Nations.”111 Congress, rather than the courts, was given the primary role in 
establishing offenses. It bears noting that for counterfeiting and 
international crimes, Congress would only declare the “punishment” rather 
than the “law and punishment.” 
After some debate in relation to piracies and felonies, “define and 
punish” was substituted for “declare the law and punishment of” at Madison 
and Randolph’s motion.112 Madison offered several reasons for the change. 
First, felony “is vague.”113 Different jurisdictions had different 
understandings of what constituted a felony. Congress must create a binding 
rule. Madison may have acted with an overabundance of caution; it is not 
clear that the change from declare to define made any real difference. For 
example, the next clause in Article I starts with “Declare (War),” and it is 
not understood to mean simply to specify and give legal recognition to an 
existing state of war; it can create such war as well.114 
One brief exchange at the Convention focused further on the meaning 
of “define” in the Clause.115 Not content with the change from “declare” to 
“define,” Gouverneur Morris suggested using “designate” instead, because 
“define” was “limited to the preexisting meaning” of a crime.116 Yet 
“others” at the Convention rejected the suggestion; they explained that 
 
for which Congress could previously only establish courts, but not to the newly created jurisdiction over 
international law offenses. 
110  See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
111  2 Farrand, supra note 69, at 168. 
112  Id. at 315–16. 
113  Id. at 316 (“[F]elony at common law is vague.”). 
114  Justice Story thought the gist of the provision was substantially the same under either wording, 
though it seems he had only a vague understanding of the debates. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES bk. III, § 1162, at 88 (photo. reprint 
1994) (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 5th ed. 1891) [hereinafter STORY] 
(discussing the “indeterminate” meaning of felony). The terms “declare” and “define” were also used 
interchangeably in the debate over the treason provision. See infra notes 133–39. 
115  No article on the scope of the Offenses power mentions this exchange, probably because it was 
made at a point when the define power still only applied to high seas crimes. See, e.g., Stephens, supra 
note 23, at 474 (“The debates at the Constitutional Convention made clear that Congress would have the 
power to punish only actual violations of the law of nations, not to create new offenses.”). 
116  2 Farrand, supra note 69, at 316. 
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“define” was “applicable to the creating of offences also, and therefore 
suited the case both of felonies & of piracies.”117 
At first glance, this may suggest that “define” was understood by the 
Framers as involving a creative power rather than a purely expository one. 
In fact, it suggests the opposite. Recall that, at the time, the term did not 
apply to offenses against the law of nations, but only to piracy and felonies 
on the high seas. Piracy was itself an offense defined by the law of 
nations.118 The response to Morris was that creating new crimes would only 
be appropriate for felonies, but not piracies.119 Congress could not make 
new piracies, the response seemed to assume, because piracy is a closed set 
in the law of nations120 whereas felony is a more flexible one. Thus, this 
exchange shows that Congress could not ignore external law of nations 
concepts through the define power. An even narrower reading of this 
discussion would be that “creating” offenses may simply mean establishing 
them through legislation as opposed to relying on their enforcement and 
definition through common law.121 At this point, Oliver Ellsworth proposed 
making “define and punish” apply equally to all four categories in the 
Clause, including law of nations offenses.122 The suggestion was 
unanimously adopted.123 
The only specific discussion of offenses occurred nearly a month later 
when delegates considered yet another revised version of the Clause. The 
exchange in question is important because it leads directly to the final 
version of the Clause:124 
 
117  Id. (emphasis added). 
118  Cf. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71 (“[T]he crime of piracy . . . is an offence 
against the universal law of society . . . .”). 
119  See STORY, supra note 114, § 1160, at 87 (“[T]he power is not merely to define and punish 
piracies, but felonies . . .; and, on this account, the power to define, as well as to punish, is peculiarly 
appropriate.”). 
120  See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 107 
(photo. reprint 2003) (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829) (“It does not seem to have been 
necessary to define the crime of piracy. There is no act on which the universal sense of nations has been 
so fully and distinctly expressed, as there is no act which is so universally punished.”); STORY, supra 
note 114, § 1159, at 86 (“If the clause of the Constitution had been confined to piracies, there would not 
have been any necessity of conferring the power to define the crime . . . . [F]or piracy is perfectly well-
known and understood in the law of nations, though it is often found defined in mere municipal codes.”). 
121  St. George Tucker treated all three terms—create, define, and declare—as synonymous, writing, 
“[T]here is a power granted to congress to create and to define and punish offences, whenever it may be 
necessary and proper to do so . . . still it appears indispensably necessary, that congress should first 
create, (that is, define and declare the punishment of,) every such offence, before it can have existence 
as such . . . .” St. George Tucker, Of the Cognizance of Crimes and Misdemeanors, reprinted in VIEW OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 395, 399 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 
Liberty Fund 1999) [hereinafter Tucker, Cognizance]. 
122  See 2 Farrand, supra note 69, at 316. 
123  See id. That is, to take out “and punish” before “counterfeiting.” 
124  Counterfeiting had been moved to its own provision. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. 
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To define & punish piracies and felonies on the high seas, and “punish” 
offences against the law of nations. 
 Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out “punish” before the words “offences 
agst. the law of nations[,]” so as to let these be definable as well as punishable, 
by virtue of the preceding member of the sentence. 
 Mr. Wilson hoped the alteration would by no means be made. To pretend to 
define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all the Civilized 
Nations of the World, would have a look of arrogance[] that would make us 
ridiculous. 
 Mr. Govr[:] The word define is proper when applied to offences in this case; 
the law of []nations[] being often too vague and deficient to be a rule. 
 On the question to strike out the word “punish” []it passed in the 
affirmative[.]125 
The reasoning for having “define” apply to “the law of nations” is the same 
as for felonies: the vagueness of the underlying law.126 The spirit of the 
discussion seemed to be that felonies and the law of nations refer to a broad 
body of law whose precise components, elements, and penalties are not set 
in stone. Congress could statutorily provide the requisite specificity. 
Note that no one took issue with Wilson’s point that the law of nations 
exists beyond the definition of any one country; this point seems to have 
been generally accepted. As Justice Iredell instructed a grand jury a few 
years later: “Even the Legislature cannot rightfully controul [the law of 
nations] . . . .”127 This all echoed an earlier statement by Lord Mansfield that 
an Act of Parliament “did not intend to alter, nor can alter the law of 
nations.”128 Under the Constitution, Congress can act contrary to 
international law in pursuance of its other powers. But the specific power to 
 
125  2 Farrand, supra note 69, at 614–15 (footnote omitted). Apparently, Morris had accepted the 
reassurances about the appropriateness of the verb “define.” 
126  See JAMES KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 2 (photo. reprint 1984) (New York, O. 
Halsted 1826) (“[T]he precepts of [the law of nations] are not defined in every case with perfect 
precision, and . . . it is often very difficult to ascertain . . . its precise injunctions and extent . . . .”). 
127  James Iredell’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina, 
GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (May 12, 1794), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 467 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) [hereinafter 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
128  Heathfield v. Chilton, (1767) 98 Eng. Rep. 50, 50 (K.B.). Wilson echoed Mansfield almost word 
for word in a grand jury instruction, suggesting that he had been aware of Heathfield at the Convention 
and that he thought the Constitution had not mooted the view he had expressed at the Convention. See 
James Wilson’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the Dist. of Virginia (May 23, 1791), 
reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 127, at 166, 179 (observing that “no state or states 
can . . . alter or abrogate the law of nations”). 
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enforce the law of nations would be understood as needing to be consistent 
with an externally determined body of law.129 
Morris did not deny that individual nations cannot make international 
law. It seems fairly clear from his comments that the purpose of the drafters 
in making offenses definable was not to allow Congress to innovate 
international law or participate in what today would be called its 
“progressive development.” Rather, the Convention wanted to allow 
Congress to choose which international norms to incorporate and to flesh 
them out enough that they could stand as criminal charges. Thus, Morris 
stresses that “define” is “proper as applied to offenses,” as opposed to the 
law of nations generally. This echoes all of the concerns about federal 
criminal common law, only magnified by the even greater vagueness of 
international law compared to common law.130 
The Offenses Clause played even less of a role in the ratifying process 
than at the Philadelphia Convention. To the extent it was mentioned, it was 
to illustrate the narrowness of federal criminal powers. As James Iredell, 
soon to be one of the first Justices of the Supreme Court, put it: 
They have power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the 
high seas, and offences against the law of nations. They have no power to 
define any other crime whatever.131 
These views assume that the law of nations served as an external limit on 
Congress’s define power. Iredell implied that Congress cannot define any 
 
129  One might think there is a difference between a constitutional power to “define . . . the law of 
nations” and an attempt to actually tinker with the law of nations itself—what Wilson seemed concerned 
with. Incorporated into the Constitution, the law of nations is no longer a body of rules for the conduct 
of countries but an enumerated legislative power. When Congress uses this power, the law of nations per 
se is unaffected unless the particular statute itself infringes or limits rights under the law of nations. 
Thus, to the extent the power is used or misused solely as a basis for regulating internal matters, the law 
of nations could be thought to be untouched, just as a suspension of habeas would not be thought to 
affect the availability of the writ in Britain. 
130  See supra note 87 and accompanying text; infra note 325 and accompanying text. 
131  Statement of James Iredell (July 29, 1788), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE 
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 219 (photo. reprint 1941) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; see also Statement of 
George Nicholas (June 17, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra, at 451 (“Congress have [sic] power to 
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the laws of 
nations; but they cannot define or prescribe the punishment of any other crime whatever, without 
violating the Constitution.”). But see Cincinnatus I: To James Wilson, Esq., N.Y. JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 
1787, reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 531–
32 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (“[C]an any one even think that does not 
comprehend a power to define and declare all publications from the press against the conduct of 
government, in making treaties, or in any other foreign transactions, an offense against the law of 
nations?”). The language of the Constitution’s supporters would soon be echoed by Thomas Jefferson’s 
broadside against the Alien and Sedition Acts. See Kentucky Resolution of 1798 and 1799 § 2, 
4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra, at 540. 
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“crime whatever” as an offense but only those made such by the consent of 
the nations of the world. It also assumes that the scope of the “Offences” 
category is not broad enough to include all or even most potentially 
criminal conduct. 
C. Text and Context 
Moving past the history of the Offenses Clause, this section will look 
to the text and semantic sources to understand how much discretion is 
implied in the power to define. First, this section will look to dictionaries 
available at the time of ratification, and then it will look to other provisions 
of the Constitution using similar language.132 
1. Operative Verbs in Other Constitutional Provisions.—The term 
“define” does not appear elsewhere in the Constitution. The closest analog 
is the Treason Clause—itself one of the only other provisions specifically 
authorizing criminal lawmaking. The treason provision gives Congress the 
power to “declare the Punishment” of the crime.133 (This echoes the draft 
language of Clause Ten—to “declare the law and punishment.”) The 
Constitution itself spells out the elements of treason; this is why it does not 
give Congress the power to define as well as punish.134 
At the Convention, treason was discussed in the very next session after 
the debate on the difference between “declare,” “designate,” and “define” in 
Clause Ten. Article III’s treason provision was repeatedly described as 
defining the offense.135 The first clause of Article III, Section Three was 
understood as performing a defining function explicitly analogous to the 
one left for Congress with regards to offenses.136 The Treason Clause was 
clearly defining against the background of an established common law 
 
132  See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756, 788–91 (1999) (explaining 
interpretive technique “using the Constitution as its own dictionary”). 
133  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. Similarly, the Counterfeiting Clause, which was spun off from the 
Define and Punish provision, gives Congress the narrower sounding power to “provide for the 
Punishment of” that crime. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. 
134  Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. Madison opposed having the Constitution itself provide a definition, 
preferring to leave it to Congress: “[I]t was inconvenient to bar a discretion which experience might 
enlighten, and which might be applied to good purposes as well as be abused.” 2 Farrand, supra note 69, 
at 345. Others warned of the dangers of leaving it undefined to avoid “abusive prosecutions”: “This is 
the crime with respect to which a jealousy is of the most importance, and accordingly it is defined with 
great plainness and accuracy . . . .” James Iredell, Marcus, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the 
New Constitution (1788), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 103, at 465, 466. 
135  2 Farrand, supra note 69, at 345–46. Echoing the Offenses Clause, Madison wanted the words 
“against the United States” in the provision to make clear that states did not have “a concurrent power so 
far as to define & punish treason.” Id. at 346 (emphasis omitted). 
136  See Alexander James Dallas, Features of Mr. Jay’s Treaty (1795), reprinted in George M. 
Dallas, LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ALEXANDER JAMES DALLAS app. at 160, 193 (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott & Co. 1871) (contrasting the Offenses Clause as giving Congress a “right to define” with the 
Treason Clause’s “actual definition” (emphasis omitted)). 
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crime and existing British statutes, whose meaning it clarified and adapted 
to U.S. circumstances. The Constitution’s defining of treason did not break 
new ground. This suggests Congress’s definitions must also work within the 
parameters of clearly established international delicts. On the other hand, 
the reason for defining treason in the Constitution was to avoid broad and 
abusive definitions by Congress or the courts. Unjust and “inaccurate” 
expansions of treason were also described as “definitions.”137 Yet even here, 
one sees an awareness by the Framers that an inaccurate defining of crimes 
could be a means to oppress the citizen. This might suggest that where the 
defining power is given in reference to an external standard, it was 
understood to be strictly limited to that standard. 
In discussing treason, the delegates used the words “declare” and 
“define” interchangeably to refer to the specification of conduct that 
constitutes an offense.138 The word “declare” was repeatedly described as 
dealing with the power to define and punish the crime. This gives further 
support to the notion that the various verbs suggested for use in Clause Ten 
did not have distinct meanings, and little should be read into the choice of 
one over the other.139 
The define Offenses power can also be contrasted with the verbs used 
for other Article I, Section Eight powers. In areas where Congress has 
plenary or broad regulatory powers, it is allowed to “make” laws or to 
“regulate.”140 Yet it is not given power to “make” offenses over the law of 
nations—these can only be made by nations of the world—only to “define” 
them.141 All other Article I powers give Congress full authority to take 
whatever measures it thinks necessary and proper in the relevant area, so 
long as they are consistent with the rest of the Constitution.142 Thus, the 
range of substantive policies Congress can adopt under the Offenses Clause 
 
137  James Wilson, Speech in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), 2 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 131, at 486, 487–88 (“If we have recourse to the history of the different 
governments that have hitherto subsisted, we shall find that a very great part of their tyranny over the 
people has arisen from the extension of the definition of treason.”). 
138  2 Farrand, supra note 69, at 345–50; see also James Madison, Debates in the Federal 
Convention of 1787, 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 447–48. 
139  “Declare” is also one of Congress’s war powers, the nature of which has been much debated. In 
this context, Justice Story cautioned against reading these constitutional verbs out of their context and 
pointed out that different verbs may really convey identical powers. For example, the power to “declare” 
war could mean simply “to proclaim, or publish,” but this would be an absurd reading. 1 STORY, supra 
note 114, § 428, at 327. Instead, “[a] power to declare war is a power to make . . . to give life . . . to the 
thing itself.” Id. 
140  See, for example, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing for power to regulate commerce); id. 
cl. 11 (“make Rules concerning Captures”); id. cl. 14 (“make Rules for . . . the land and naval Forces”); 
and most significantly, id. cl. 18 (“[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper”). 
141  See Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 297, 299 (1865) (“To define is to give the limits or 
precise meaning of a word or thing in being; to make is to call into being. Congress has power to define, 
not to make, the laws of nations . . . .”). 
142  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323–24 (1819). 
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appears to be exogenously delimited in a way that sets it apart from other 
Article I powers. 
To be sure, international customary law will require elaboration by 
Congress because it is vague and incompletely specified. It does not 
“partake of the prolixity of a legal code,” as Marshall would say of the 
Constitution,143 and thus requires legislative specification. Even well-
defined international offenses often leave a myriad of details to be filled in 
by national courts—rules of secondary liability, attempt and impossibility, 
evidence, statutes of limitation, and so forth.144 When international law is 
silent as to these second-order questions, Congress can act freely.145 But 
Congress’s role is to choose primary norms and fill in interstitial questions 
or uncertainties, not to establish new grounds of culpability beyond what 
exists in international law.146 
2. Dictionaries and Contemporaneous Usage.—Consulting late 
eighteenth-century dictionaries can help us understand how constitutional 
terms would have been understood by a contemporary audience. Such 
tomes are standard tools of originalist interpretation. There is great 
postmodern irony in using them to define “define.” The dictionaries do not 
definitively define “define”—at least the definitions do not clearly resolve 
questions about the constitutional power. The primary meaning of “define” 
seems to weakly favor the narrow view of the power. According to the 
lexicons, defining is not a creative act; to define something is to narrow it 
rather than to expand it.147 
 
143  Id. at 407 (discussing the Constitution). 
144  Similarly, many federal causes of action have similar details undefined because of the burden of 
determining these policies for each statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a cause of action for 
violations of civil rights under color of state law). In such cases, a federal court may fashion its own rule 
or look to state law for rules of decision. In such cases, the federal court does not create the offense but 
may give it definition. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985) (adopting state tort statute of 
limitations for § 1983 cases). 
145  Thus, shortly after ratification, Chief Justice Thomas McKean of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court—a leading member of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention and signer of the Declaration of 
Independence—upheld a Pennsylvania statute providing for juries in cases involving captured naval 
prizes, contrary to the practice of “most nations.” Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160, 162 (Pa. 
1792). Such incidental details as the mode of proof were properly filled in by national laws: “[T]he law 
of nations, or of nature and reason, is in arbitrary states enforced by the royal power, in others, by the 
municipal law of the country; which latter may, I conceive, facilitate or improve the execution of its 
decisions, by any means they shall think best, provided the great universal law remains unaltered.” Id. 
(third and fourth emphases added). 
146  This definition appears to have been endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1820 in a case about 
defining piracy. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159 (1820) (noting that “define” 
could mean the “express enumeration of all the particulars included in that term”). 
147  SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, Harrison & Co. 1786) 
(“[t]o give the definition; to explain a thing by its qualities and circumstances,” or, secondarily, “to 
circumscribe; to mark the limit; to bound”); WILLIAM PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 188 (1st Am. ed. 1788) (“to explain; mark out; decide, determine”); THOMAS SHERIDAN, A 
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Contemporaneous legal usage of the term in the ratification process 
confirms the point.148 “Define” usually means to explicate a preexisting 
meaning, though perhaps not without some license.149 Thus, in grand jury 
instructions in 1791, Justice James Iredell described the define power as 
one to “expound” in greater detail preexisting international law.150 
Similarly, in describing the first Crimes Act, James Wilson observed that 
the crimes of piracy, murder, manslaughter, perjury, and so forth were 
neither defined nor described. That is, the law simply names these crimes. 
Thus, “define” here means not to create a particular crime or criminalize 
particular conduct, but to enumerate the elements and other details of the 
offense. Moreover, Wilson explained that courts “must refer to some pre-
existing law for their definition,” namely, the common law.151 This shows 
that define relates to existing meanings, not the creation of new ones. 
Moreover, while Wilson was discussing the interpretation of a statute, 
presumably the term “piracy” in the Constitution, which gave rise to the 
respective statutory term, would be interpreted the same way. “Define” was 
most often used in the ratification discussions to describe the powers of the 
federal government under the Constitution and was used in the sense of 
limiting and narrowing defined powers rather than general ones.152 The 
defining of Congress’s power was synonymous with the limiting of it. But 
if the law of nations could be expanded rather than limited by defining, the 
act of defining would lose its principal political virtue of contracting the 
scope of political authority. In another context, the first non-Indian treaty 
submitted to the Senate was a consular convention with France purporting 
to “define[] and establish[] the [f]unctions and [p]rivileges of their 
respective [c]onsuls.”153 Consular relations already existed between the 
 
COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 1789) (“to explain a thing by its qualities; 
to circumscribe, to mark the limit” or, secondarily, “to determine, to decide”). 
148  To be sure, “define” is an extremely common word, and this Article does not pretend to have 
surveyed all of its contemporaneous usages. Naturally, its most common meaning was to give the 
definition of something, like a dictionary. 
149  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 123 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“Laws are a 
dead letter, without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation.”). 
150  See James Iredell’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Apr. 2, 1793), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 127, at 348, 355 (observing that the 
“Offences” Congress is authorized to punish are “materially the same in every Country,” with only the 
practical application specified by Congress). 
151  James Wilson’s Charge to the Grand Jury in the Circuit for the District of Virginia (May 23, 
1791), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 127, at 166, 176. 
152  See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 64, 140, 220. 
153  Convention Defining and Establishing the Functions and Privileges of Consuls and Vice 
Consuls, U.S.-Fr., Nov. 14, 1788, 8 Stat. 106. An earlier draft of the Convention apparently used the 
language “determining and fixing” instead of “defining and establishing,” though the change appears to 
be immaterial. See Report of Secretary Jay, Respecting French and American Consuls (July 4, 1786), in 
1 THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 304, 305 (Washington, 
D.C., Francis Preston Blair 1833). 
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nations by virtue of an earlier treaty; the new one specified and elaborated 
their rights and functions.154 
D. Early Congresses 
In the first decade of the Republic, Congress passed several laws that 
might have implicated the Offenses power.155 Such “liquidation” of the 
Constitution’s meaning gains additional traction (and not only for 
originalists) when unopposed by contrary judicial opinion. Yet several 
factors complicate this inquiry, or limit what can be learned from it. To 
begin with, Congress generally did not articulate the Article I basis of these 
laws, or at least left no record of such discussions. Second, the most far-
reaching of these enactments never received judicial construction. So for 
those acts that do not specifically invoke the law of nations, whether they 
fall under the Offenses Clause has largely been a matter of ex post 
conjecture. Naturally this conjecture is itself colored by one’s 
understanding of the scope of the Offenses power. Finally, determining 
whether a particular law represents a broad or narrow understanding of the 
Offenses Clause involves a complex historical inquiry of evaluating the law 
against the law of nations as it stood, or was understood, in the 1790s. 
Given the difficulty of pinning down the parameters of contemporary 
international law, the historical inquiry is even more difficult. Still, it 
appears that Congress only exercised the Offenses power over the most 
clearly and universally established law of nations offenses. In one or two 
instances in the early Republic, the Offenses Clause was invoked, in 
passing, as a constitutional support for controversial legislation in situations 
where the regulated conduct did not clearly run afoul of the law of nations. 
In these cases, the Offenses claim was resisted and ultimately abandoned. 
1. The First Congress: Common Law Crimes and Alien Torts.—In 
the first criminal code, the Crimes Act of 1790, Congress included the three 
law of nations offenses that had been incorporated into the common law156: 
 
154  Emory R. Johnson, The Early History of the United States Consular Service. 1776–1792., 
13 POL. SCI. Q. 19, 25 (1898). One of the objections the United States had to earlier drafts was that it 
would have given consuls protections they did not currently enjoy under the law of nations. Id. at 38. 
155  The actions of early Congresses, and the First Congress in particular, have long been regarded as 
“contemporaneous and weighty evidence of [the Constitution’s] true meaning.” Wisconsin v. Pelican 
Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821) 
(Marshall, C.J.) (dictum). But see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803). Yet many 
public-meaning originalists would not give much significance to post-ratification actions by Congress. 
Certainly their actions do not provide an exhaustive illustration of the meaning of constitutional terms. 
Under the Offenses Clause, much of the legislation passed by early Congresses is entirely 
uncontroversial. As shall be seen, the central question about the controversial parts are whether they 
were thought to be exercises of the Offenses power at all, that is, whether they could be used as any kind 
of originalist evidence. 
156  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2006). 
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piracy,157 lawsuits against ambassadors and other foreign officials,158 and 
violations of safe conducts and physical violence against ambassadors.159 
The latter two laws explicitly invoked “the law of nations”160 and dealt with 
well-established offenses.161 The criminalized offenses were ones that both 
triggered individual liability and at the same time gave rise to international 
legal responsibility on the part of the United States.162 The nature of the 
“definition” was to specify the scope of protection and liability in more 
detail than would be found in international law.163 Thus where the 
“definition” differed from the law of nations—such as the detailed 
exceptions to the protection of foreign officials’ domestic servants—it was 
to limit the scope of the law. The ambassador and safe conduct crimes 
resulted in few recorded prosecutions, none of which brought into question 
the scope of the define power.164 
2. The Neutrality Act.—The Neutrality Act arose out of a 
controversial proclamation by George Washington in 1793. His 
Administration wanted to keep the United States out of the war between 
France and Britain. The law of nations placed limits on the kind of support 
neutral nations could provide to belligerents. The declaration announced 
that the United States would adhere to the restrictions and pledged to take 
measures against Americans who aided one of the belligerents, thereby 
potentially drawing the United States into the conflict.165 
 
157  An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 
113 (1790) [hereinafter Crimes Act of 1790]. 
158  Id. §§ 25–27. The Act declared all legal process against the persons null and void, and that the 
attorneys and others involved in such litigation “shall be deemed violators of the laws of nations, and 
disturbers of the public repose, and imprisoned not exceeding three years.” Id. § 26. Its constitutionality 
was assumed by the court in Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
159  Crimes Act of 1790 § 28 (providing punishment if “any person shall violate any safe-conduct or 
passport duly obtained and issued under the authority of the United States, or shall assault, strike, 
wound, imprison, or in any other manner infract the law of nations, by offering violence to the person of 
an ambassador or other public minister”). 
160  The piracy provision was amended in 1819 to do so as well. 
161  See Bellia & Clark, supra note 71, at 513–14. The provisions relating to ambassadors essentially 
recapitulated Queen Anne’s Diplomatic Privilege Act of 1708. See Fredman, supra note 25, at 293. 
162  See Bellia & Clark, supra note 71, at 514. 
163  United States v. Benner, 24 F. Cas. 1084, 1086 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830) (No. 14,568) (upholding the 
statutory limitation of offenses against ambassadors to those recognized by the President). 
164  See United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467, 468–69 (1826) (holding that prosecution 
for assault on an ambassador does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); 
Benner, 24 F. Cas. at 1086 (citing other cases); see also Fredman, supra note 25, at 296. 
165  Proclamation of Neutrality by George Washington (Dec. 3, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 140 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales 
& Seaton 1833) [hereinafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS]: 
I do hereby also make known, that whosoever of the citizens of the United States shall render 
himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing, aiding, or 
abetting hostilities against any of the said Powers . . . will not receive the protection of the United 
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The proclamation led to a pamphlet debate between Hamilton and 
Madison, focusing on the Executive’s power over foreign relations.166 The 
one prosecution instituted pursuant to the proclamation gave rise to a 
complex debate on the existence of federal common law crimes and 
ultimately ended in acquittal despite a powerful jury charge from Justice 
Wilson.167 
The regulations promulgated by President Washington (like the 
subsequent Neutrality Act) covered a wide range of conduct, from actually 
making war on neutral countries to fitting out foreign privateers and 
warships in U.S. ports to service by Americans on such privateers. 
Congress shortly passed a law, at Washington’s request, called the 
Neutrality Act, criminalizing the kind of filibustering described in the 
declaration and removing any concerns about separation of powers.168 
Whether the law was an exercise of the Offenses power goes to the 
heart of differing conceptions of the Clause. International law did not 
prohibit private citizens from carrying contraband to belligerents, nor did it 
bar the service of a third-country national on belligerent privateers.169 Some 
of the Act’s provisions were designed to avoid potential foreign 
entanglements entirely, rather than maintain a legal nonbelligerency. 
However, the theory behind the Neutrality Proclamation was that “[i]t is not 
sufficient . . . that a neutral should withdraw its protection from those who 
commit, aid, or abet hostilities against belligerents; to preserve its 
neutrality, the United States must also prosecute and punish them . . . .”170 
Thus, while an American did not directly violate the law of nations by 
 
States . . . ; and further, that I have given instructions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to 
cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons, who shall, within the cognizance of the 
courts of the United States, violate the law of nations, with respect to the Powers at war . . . . 
166  The exchange came to be known as the Pacificus–Helvidius debates. Madison (Helvidius) 
argued that because the Constitution commits the power to decide whether to wage war to Congress, the 
President cannot unilaterally decide on a policy of peace. ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, 
THE PACIFICUS–HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING 70 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007). Hamilton (Pacificus) explained that until Congress declared 
war, peace was its policy, which Washington was simply trying to preserve. Id. at 13–14. 
167  See Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1119–22 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360). 
168  Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington Administration, 
46 U. RICH. L. REV. 373, 440–41 & n.341 (2012). 
169  Id. at 430. Indeed, privateering under a writ of marquee from a recognized belligerent was, as a 
matter of international law, entirely legal for the individuals involved; this is what distinguished it from 
piracy. While nations restricted the service of their subjects on foreign men-of-war, this was seen as a 
matter of national foreign policy, and not the enforcement of a specific law of nations norm. See Eugene 
Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 183, 211–14 (2004). 
170  Reinstein, supra note 168, at 438 (discussing Justice Jay’s grand jury charge in Henfield’s Case). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1710 
serving on a privateer, the United States had a duty under international law, 
the argument went, to prevent violations of its neutrality.171 
President Washington’s policy in the Neutrality Proclamation was 
heavily informed by Vattel’s discussion of the duties of neutrals as 
established by the law of nations.172 Yet because the criminalized conduct 
did not necessarily violate the law of nations in and of itself, it would give 
an expansive cast to “Offences” if Congress followed a similar rationale in 
its legislation. (The Declaration itself was an exercise of some Article II 
powers.)173 
While Washington may have seen himself as enforcing the law of 
nations, it is far from clear that Congress intended to exercise the Offenses 
power in passing the Neutrality Act.174 It did not describe the law as 
Offenses legislation when it was passed; the characterization was first made 
only a century later.175 Unlike the earlier Offenses legislation, the Neutrality 
Act makes no reference to international law. Thus the relevant question 
about the Neutrality Act is not what it teaches about the scope of the 
Offenses power, but whether it has anything to teach about it.176 
The strongest evidence that the Act was understood as an Offenses 
Clause measure is that President Washington repeatedly invoked the law of 
nations in his proclamation, and it was frequently mentioned in Henfield’s 
Case. The Act was designed to provide a subsequent statutory basis for the 
 
171  Id. at 438–39. Justice Wilson saw Henfield’s violation of the law of nations as being 
interchangeable with the “injury to the nation” from potentially costing it its neutrality, as defined by the 
law of nations. Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1116. 
172  See Reinstein, supra note 168, at 440 (“The Washington administration acted on the belief that 
by prosecuting Henfield and others it was fulfilling its duty to follow the obligations of the law of 
nations as expounded by Vattel . . . .”). 
173  See id. at 441 (arguing the Declaration was an exercise of the Take Care Clause, as the law of 
nations was part of the common law). 
174  See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 207 (2007) 
(observing that the Act “go[es] beyond anything the law of nations required at the time”); Report of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 26, 1866), reprinted in THE COUNTER CASE OF GREAT BRITAIN AS 
LAID BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION, CONVENED AT GENEVA 678 (1872) (“The Act of 1794 
was not passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution making it the duty of Congress to 
punish offenses against the law of nations. [It applied to conduct] not [criminalized] in previous 
legislation of this or other nations, but mainly created by the act itself.”). But see Reinstein, supra note 
168, at 443 (arguing that the Act was an Offenses Clause measure). 
175  The notion of the Neutrality Proclamation as an offenses law seems to have been popularized by 
United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887). See also RAMSEY, supra note 174, at 207; Kent, 
supra note 2, at 861–62 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of both uses of the Law of 
Nations Clause). 
176  The Neutrality Act has been amended several times since its original enactment, most recently in 
1948. International law today clearly does not bar private assistance to belligerents by nationals of a 
neutral state, nor does it make such assistance a valid casus belli. Thus, it would be hard to understand 
the basis for the continued validity of the law if it were Offenses Clause legislation unless one accepts a 
very broad understanding of the power. 
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proclamation and prosecutions under it.177 This argument can be turned 
around: the repeated reference to offenses against the law of nations are 
nowhere to be found in the Act, perhaps because Congress understood there 
were no such offenses involved.178 Of course, the necessary and proper 
power applies in full to Offenses legislation. Those parts of the Act that did 
not deal with genuine violations of neutrality may have been seen as closely 
related enough that they would be the start of a slippery slope, leading to 
genuine violations. 
Alternatively, the Act could more readily be understood as an exercise 
of Congress’s war powers, or as supporting and “carrying into effect the 
President’s power to set foreign policy (in this case, to declare 
neutrality).”179 Indeed, both sides in the constitutional debate over the 
declaration saw the issues as relating primarily to the war powers; both 
agreed that private citizens making war on neutral states threatened the 
effective exercise of Congress’s power to pick wars.180 The question was 
whether the President’s declaration suffered from the same objection.181 
Madison never complained that Washington had exercised Congress’s 
Article I power over offenses.182 One could see the Pacificus–Helvidius 
debate as a more general one about which branch has primacy in the setting 
of foreign policy. The treaty power was also implicated in the law—though 
treaties were, for various reasons, not mentioned in the proclamation.183 
Both the proclamation and the subsequent law were widely explained as 
 
177  Similarly, when Washington came to Congress to ask for legislation to back his policy, he said 
congressional action was needed “where the penalties on violations of the law of nations may have been 
indistinctly marked, or are inadequate.” George Washington, Speech Delivered to the Senate and House 
of Representatives (Dec. 3, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 165, at 22. 
178  Having approved the declaration, the Administration found it difficult to determine what the 
relevant offenses actually were, leading to Secretary of State Jefferson’s famous unanswered request for 
an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Chief Justice and Judges 
of the Supreme Court of the United States (July 18, 1793), in 7 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451 
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, Knickerbocker Press, federal ed. 1904). 
179  See RAMSEY, supra note 174, at 207. 
180  This is how the Neutrality Act would continue to be understood in its subsequent incarnations. 
See, e.g., James Buchanan, A Message to the Senate of the United States (Jan. 7, 1858), in 7 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2999 (New York, Bureau of National 
Literature, Inc. 1897) (“[Private citizens making war] is a usurpation of the war-making power, which 
belongs alone to Congress . . . .”). 
181  Madison’s argument that Washington had intruded on Congress’s declare war power reflects a 
surprisingly broad “dormant” conception of the relevant authority. The Supreme Court held 150 years 
later that the war powers continue after the conclusion of hostilities to allow for dealing with 
demobilization and similar issues. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141–42 (1948). 
Madison’s nominally “strict” construction would have the power also available before a war is declared, 
which would mean the power was always on. 
182  See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–1801, 
at 178–79 (1997) (noting that Madison had failed to make “the strongest argument” against the 
declaration—assuming that Madison saw it as an attempt to exercise the define Offenses power). 
183  See Lobel, supra note 28, at 15–17; Reinstein, supra note 168, at 431–33. 
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necessary to fulfill obligations in treaties—the Treaty of Peace with Britain 
and, especially, the Treaty of Amity with France.184 Indeed, many references 
in the neutrality debates to the “law of nations” could have meant treaties, 
which were themselves part of the law of nations.185 
Further pursuing the policy of avoiding provocation with other 
sovereigns, early Congresses also passed laws criminalizing a variety of 
ordinary offenses by Americans against Indians in Indian country. Such 
crimes would not violate international law, as the United States was not 
responsible for the conduct of its nationals outside its jurisdiction. The 
measures, like the others discussed in this Part, were designed to prevent 
Americans from triggering war with Indian tribes and thus implicated the 
war and foreign policy powers.186 
3. The Alien Acts.—The infamous Alien Acts of 1798 are not 
generally thought to be an exercise of the Offenses power, yet they 
provided the occasion for the only explicit discussion of the scope of the 
define power in the early Republic. Again motivated by fears of an 
imminent war with France and ongoing French intrigues in the United 
States, the Federalist-dominated Congress passed a relatively 
uncontroversial Alien Enemies Act (AEA), allowing the president to expel 
nationals of hostile countries in time of war.187 While there were ongoing 
hostilities with France and a concern that full-fledged war might develop, 
France was not yet officially a hostile power, and thus French citizens in the 
United States were not yet “enemy aliens.” Yet the Federalists feared that 
French residents were already hatching conspiracies against the United 
States.188 Congress wanted to act against such plots before a formal 
declaration of war, so it passed a second act—this time with only Federalist 
 
184  See Reinstein, supra note 168, at 432. In presenting his proclamation to Congress, Washington 
explained: “In this posture of affairs, both new and delicate, I resolved to adopt general rules, which 
should conform to the treaties, and assert the privileges, of the United States.” George Washington, 
Speech Delivered to the Senate and House of Representatives (Dec. 3, 1973), in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS, supra note 165, at 21. 
185  The law of nations was both an umbrella term for international law of all kinds, as well as the 
more specific kind produced through custom as opposed to treaty. 
186  The law was actually called “[a]n Act . . . to preserve Peace on the Frontiers.” Jack M. Balkin, 
Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24–25 & n.85 (2010) (arguing that these laws were an exercise of the 
Indian commerce power and thus support a broad reading of “commerce” throughout the Commerce 
Clauses). At the time, no one suggested that these laws exercised either the Indian commerce or the 
Offenses power. Their functional similarity to the Neutrality Act suggests that the Indian laws should be 
understood as treaty or war power measures. This interpretation does raise the question of the limits on 
Congress’s ability to ban conduct that, because it is vexatious to a foreign power, could lead to war. 
Direct assaults on foreigners, as in the Neutrality and Indian Trafficking laws, seem well within the safe 
zone. 
187  An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 
(2006)). 
188  See Speech of Mr. Charles Pinckney (May 20, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 
333, 334–35. 
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support—which gave the president the power to also expel neutral aliens 
that “he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United 
States.”189 
The Alien “Friends” Act, as the second of the two alien laws was 
known, and the contemporaneous Sedition Act were extraordinarily 
controversial. The Virginia and Kentucky legislatures passed resolutions 
proclaiming the laws unconstitutional and void—an early exercise in 
nullification that was controversial in its own right. As an Article I basis for 
the Alien Act, Congress put its principal reliance on the “power of war and 
peace” (as with the Neutrality Act).190 However, at least some Republicans 
had supported the Alien Enemies Act as, inter alia, an exercise of the 
Offenses power.191 So in the subsequent debates over the Virginia resolves, 
Federalists argued—very much in the alternative—that the Alien “Friends” 
Act also fell within Congress’s law of nations power.192 To be sure, the 
Offenses Clause justification was a sideshow in the debate over the 
constitutionality of the Alien Act. The Virginia resolves were sent to other 
states for approbation; no state joined in. Indeed, several legislatures 
returned the resolves with statements supporting the constitutionality of the 
Act. These answers uniformly justified the statute on something like war 
powers or related national defense arguments, making no mention of law of 
nations offenses.193 
In the wake of the failure of the Virginia resolves to find support from 
other states, their author, James Madison, drafted another resolution for the 
Virginia legislature, more fully setting out the theory of the earlier resolve. 
The Report of 1800 considered every potential issue in the debates over the 
Alien and Sedition Acts. It is also considered one of the last great 
 
189  An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798). Because the Alien Act expired in two 
years, and was of course not renewed by the incoming Republican legislature in 1800, it never received 
judicial review. 
190  Report of Congress on the Alien and Sedition Laws (1799), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 
131, at 441. 
191  Andrew Lenner, Separate Spheres: Republican Constitutionalism in the Federalist Era, 41 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 250, 267 (1997). 
192  Id. at 271. The argument seems more rhetorical than serious; supporters of the Alien “Friends” 
Act put forth a laundry list of Article I grounds, several manifestly not serious. See Madison’s Report on 
the Virginia Resolutions, 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 546, 558 (considering whether laws 
could be seen as exercises of marque and reprisal power). 
193  See, e.g., Answer of the Massachusetts State Senate (Feb. 9, 1799), 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra 
note 131, at 533, 534–35: 
 The legislature of Massachusetts . . . do explicitly declare, that they consider the acts of 
Congress, commonly called “the Alien and Sedition Acts,” not only constitutional, but expedient 
and necessary . . . That Congress, having been especially intrusted by the people with the general 
defence of the nation, had not only the right, but were bound, to protect it against internal as well 
as external foes: That the United States, at the time of passing the Act concerning Aliens, were 
threatened with actual invasion; had been driven, by the unjust and ambitious conduct of the 
French government, into warlike preparations, expensive and burdensome; and had then, within 
the bosom of the country, thousands of aliens, who, we doubt not, were ready to coöperate in any 
external attack. 
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constitutional statements of Founding Era interpretation. Inter alia, Madison 
responded to the claim that the Alien Act was part of the Offenses power. 
He argued that Congress exceeded its power to define because expelling 
neutral aliens goes beyond the law of nations: 
 It is said, further, that, by the law and practice of nations, aliens may be 
removed, at discretion, for offences against the law of nations; that Congress 
are authorized to define and punish such offences; and that to be dangerous to 
the peace of society is, in aliens, one of those offences. 
 The distinction between alien enemies and alien friends is a clear and 
conclusive answer to this argument. Alien enemies are under the law of 
nations, and liable to be punished for offences against it. Alien friends, except 
in the single case of public ministers, are under the municipal law, and must be 
tried and punished according to that law only. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Under this view of the subject, the act of Congress for the removal of 
alien enemies, being conformable to the law of nations, is justified by the 
Constitution; and the “act” for the removal of alien friends, being repugnant to 
the constitutional principles of municipal law, is unjustifiable.194 
Madison maintained that Congress’s use of the define Offenses power 
is strictly limited by international law and can be reviewed against that 
standard. If international law makes being an enemy alien an offense, 
Congress cannot expand the definition. The Federalists, on the other hand, 
claimed that the distinction made by the law of nations is based on 
“dangerousness” of aliens, not their formal allegiance. In other words, the 
Federalists contested the content of international law, not Congress’s power 
to define. No one suggested congressional ability to create novel offenses, 
though the Federalists did seem to suggest the borders of a recognized 
offense can be stretched to catch similarly harmful conduct. 
Some scholars have wondered why, if international law authorizes the 
removal of enemy aliens, this would have anything to do with them 
committing an offense, or why removal would be a punishment.195 Vattel, 
for example, says that enemy nationals in one’s territory can be treated as 
enemies, but gives no suggestion that their presence violates international 
law.196 Thus, even the invocation of the Clause for the Alien Enemies Act 
could suggest a fairly capacious understanding of the provision that allows 
not just for the punishment of actual violations of international law by 
individuals, but of any conduct that either carries international law 
implications for the United States or that may be regulated under 
international law. 
 
194  Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 546, 
556–57. 
195  See Lenner, supra note 191, at 271. 
196  3 VATTEL, supra note 91, § 63, at 386. 
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Madison was aware of this problem and sought to address it. He noted 
that “referring the alien act to the power of Congress to define and punish 
offences against the law of nations” requires “that the act is of a penal, not 
merely of a preventive operation,” and that it punish an offense.197 He goes 
on to argue that the offense is committed by the enemy nation by the very 
fact that it is at war with the United States.198 That nation is punished, inter 
alia, by expelling its nationals, since nations cannot be directly dealt with 
through judicial process. 
Thus, two things emerge quite clearly about Madison. First, he took a 
very narrow view of Congress’s ability to create novel offenses, even by 
stretching the definitions of existing ones. Second, he clearly saw the 
Offenses power as a punitive one, and not a general tool of foreign 
relations. Finally, he appeared to believe that, while the scope of the define 
power was limited, “Offences” included action that is not individually 
wrongful. In any case, the attempt to square the Alien Enemies Act with the 
Offenses Clause was forced, as the Offenses Clause was quite peripheral to 
the debate over the laws, which were generally seen as an exercise of war 
powers.199 
While the Supreme Court would, a century later, use the Neutrality 
Acts as a model for a sweepingly broad reading of the Offenses Clause,200 it 
does not seem as though it had previously been understood as Offenses 
legislation at all, at least not in its entirety. In particular, early 
commentators like Story, Rawle, and Kent did not mention the famous and 
controversial law in their discussion of Congress’s exercises of the 
constitutional power.201 
4. International Slave Trade.—Congress’s last encounter with the 
Offenses power in the early Republic resulted in it not adopting a measure 
 
197  Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 546, 
556. 
198  Id. at 556–57. Presumably the “offense” consisted of creating a casus belli, which would be a 
violation of the law of nations or of making illegal war against the United States. In Vattel’s treatise, the 
assumption was that war was a consequence of one nation violating international law. See VATTEL, 
supra note 91, §§ 26–28, 41, at 375 (“When an offensive war has for its object the punishment of a 
nation, like every other war, it is to be founded on right and necessity. 1. On right; an injury must have 
been actually received.”). Anthony Colangelo has recently argued that the Offenses Clause allows for 
the “punishment” of states as well as people, which fits nicely with Madison’s argument for the 
constitutionality of the Enemy Aliens Act. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 2. 
199  The Offenses Clause was only enlisted in support of the AEA as a distant “back-up.” See 
RAWLE, supra note 120, at 100 (“In the case of alien enemies, the . . . right of sending them away, is an 
incident to the right of carrying on public war. It is not mentioned in the Constitution, but it properly 
appertains to those who are to conduct the war.”); supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. War 
powers were a quite natural fit since someone became an “enemy” as a consequence of a declaration of 
war. 
200  United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887); see infra Part III.A. 
201  They also make no mention of the Alien Acts. 
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that would purport to extend the international criminalization of piracy to 
the slave trade because it would involve defining beyond what the law of 
nations at that point permitted.202 Early in the nineteenth century, Congress 
took aggressive action to shut down the transatlantic slave trade. A series of 
statutes provided severe punishments for American vessels involved in the 
trade.203 However, the trade simply shifted to other flags. Many in the 
United States and Britain came to believe that the slave trade could only be 
abolished by making it an offense against the law of nations, like piracy. 
Yet when Congress passed its most draconian law against the slave trade in 
1820, it made clear that while it wanted to label it as an international crime 
akin to piracy—which would allow for the prosecution of offenders 
regardless of their nationality—it could not do so until international law, as 
created by the nations of the world as a whole, caught up with this position. 
Congressional reports specifically tied the inability to regulate the 
transatlantic slave trade as a piracy or felony to the limitations of the define 
and punish power.204 As Charles Fenton Mercer, the chairman of the House 
committee for the abolition of the slave trade, wrote, “[T]he Constitutional 
power of the Government has already been exercised in defining the crime 
of piracy . . . .”205 Until the practice of nations caught up with the 
enlightened Anglo-American view, “any exercise of the authority of 
Congress, to define and punish this crime” could only be done through the 
more flexible high seas felonies power, not the piracies and Offenses 
powers.206 
Notably, the Administration and other observers agreed with 
Congress’s limited interpretation of its powers. And the narrow 
interpretation worked principally to let foreign slave traders off while 
American ones could be punished by death. Finally, Congress would not 
have been without some sources to cite if it wanted to label the slave trade 
as a violation of the law of nations. A series of international summits had 
condemned the trade and called for its abolition, and Britain had labeled it 
piracy.207 Just a few years later, Justice Story would famously conclude, 
based on general principles of natural law and morality, that the slave trade 
 
202  A fuller account of this episode can be found in Kontorovich, Define and Punish, supra note 21, 
at 194–98. 
203  Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (prohibiting the importation of slaves after January 1, 
1808); Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, §§ 4–5, 3 Stat. 600, 600–01. 
204  For a fuller discussion of this episode, see Kontorovich, Define and Punish, supra note 21, at 
194–96. 
205  36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2210 (1820). 
206  Id. 
207  See Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts: The Forgotten 
Precedent of Slave-Trade Tribunals, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 61–62 (2009) [hereinafter Kontorovich, 
International Courts]. 
106:1675 (2012) Law of Nations Clause 
 1717
was a violation of the law of nations,208 only to be overruled by Justice 
Marshall.209 Thus, in 1820, a congressional definition of the slave trade as a 
violation of international law would have been ahead of any international 
consensus but at least somewhat colorable. It would not have had to make 
the offense out of whole cloth, only to promote some cases and conventions 
beyond the weight they could reasonably bear. Congress made clear that 
while it could contribute to the progressive development of international 
norms, it could not do so through the define and punish power itself. That 
power was reserved for things that had quite clearly been recognized and 
treated as international offenses by other countries. 
E. Summary 
The originalist evidence is too thin to be decisive and is not entirely 
unidirectional. On the whole, it supports the narrow, constrained version of 
the Offenses power. The purposes and historical background of “Offenses,” 
its limited role in the ratification processes, and the language itself tend to 
suggest a limited scope to the definitions of “defining” and “offenses.” At 
the Convention, the central notion behind the define powers was to require 
that, before anyone be punished for violating international law norms, 
Congress act to bring certainty to preexisting but vague customary norms. 
The Offenses power was thought of and grouped with a few rather narrow 
criminal powers, all of which dealt with well-established wrongful conduct. 
Furthermore, the term “define” has a narrower meaning than those used to 
confer the plenary regulatory powers of Congress. 
More decisively, the define power also pertained to piracy and high 
seas felonies, and in both those contexts was understood to be limited by 
the external legal content of those terms. The define power could be no 
broader than the category to be defined. Given the lack of early judicial 
precedent, or even extensive discussions, of the offenses provisions, the 
high seas cases are perhaps the strongest available evidence about the 
contemporaneous meaning of the define power. It shows that Congress 
cannot define two plus two to be four or murder plus high seas to be piracy. 
In a case involving the piracy power, the Supreme Court echoed the 
earlier views of Marshall and Wilson that only “real” piracies can be 
defined as such. Similarly, in cases about felonies, the Court made clear that 
Congress’s definitions had to fit within some objective external definition 
both of felonies and of the high seas. 
The actions of the early Congresses are more equivocal. They largely 
limited themselves to the most generally agreed-upon offenses, but this 
does not disprove their potential power to have acted more aggressively. In 
 
208  United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 848–51 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) 
(Story, J.). 
209  The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122–23 (1825). 
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the Alien Act controversy, Madison resisted the notion that Congress could 
establish offenses outside the clear core of the law of nations, and his 
position apparently received no rejoinder.210 However, the significance of 
this can be limited because the offenses issue was quite peripheral to the 
constitutional debate. The Neutrality Acts can be read as advancing a broad 
notion of “Offences” as any acts that would create legal responsibility to 
foreign countries, or perhaps even political responsibility, on the part of the 
United States. Yet it is not clear whether Congress considered the measure 
an exercise of the Offenses power at all. One might note a tension between 
the Neutrality Act and the Alien Act. In the latter, it seems to have been 
agreed that being an enemy alien could be a status punishable as an offense. 
Yet under the U.S.-responsibility theory of offenses, enemy aliens would be 
entirely outside the scope, as their actions would never be attributed to the 
United States. 
Yet a narrow notion of “define” does not mean a lack of deference to 
such definitions once made. Here, the particular character of international 
custom plays the decisive role.211 As Morris stressed at the Convention, the 
content of international custom is nebulous and changing. It cannot be 
determined by reference to any precise set of materials, to say nothing of 
materials in English.212 Thus, considerable deference is appropriate, not 
because the Offenses Clause is any kind of special or plenary power, but 
because the vagueness of the law of nations itself makes it difficult to 
determine if Congress has strayed beyond its Article I authorization. In this 
zone of vagueness, Congress’s decisions should not be easily second-
guessed. Yet occasionally, international law is quite precise—such as about 
what constitutes piracy.213 If deference to Offenses legislation is a function 
of the inherent vagueness of international law, it would be inappropriate 
cases where international law has developed a clear, narrow, and undisputed 
definition.214 
III. THE COURTS AND DEFINING OFFENSES 
In the Constitution’s first century, the federal courts never considered 
the meaning or scope of the Offenses power and have rarely done so since. 
Moreover, even in the cases that have addressed the power, the offenses 
discussions are often secondary to the other, clearer Article I powers, and 
 
210  See supra text accompanying note 194. 
211  See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 859 (2006) (discussing the development of custom in international law). 
212  United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163 n.a (1820) (surveying treatises in several 
different languages). 
213  See id. 
214  See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). 
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were perhaps not necessary to the decision.215 Thus, this Part begins by 
examining judicial construction of “define and punish” in the other contexts 
where they have been applied—piracies and felonies on the high seas. 
These powers also have raised the question of whether Congress can define 
things as “piracies” or “felonies” that go beyond the generally understood 
common or international law meaning of these terms. Unlike with offenses, 
courts dealt with these questions in the first decades of the Constitution, and 
the definition of piracies enjoyed the attention of some of the nation’s 
leading jurists. These cases support a narrow understanding of “define and 
punish” as it applies to all the terms that follow it. 
The Offenses power itself had only recently come into focus as the sole 
Article I authority for any laws. An initial review of the few Offenses 
Clause cases suggests anarchy. Courts have applied greatly varying 
standards of review to Offenses legislation. Yet two things emerge clearly 
from the cases. First, the courts have always at least gone through the 
motions of measuring legislative definitions against the external standard of 
international law—Congress does not have carte blanche.216 Secondly, while 
the courts have been largely deferential to definitions, that discretion turns 
into strict scrutiny when Congress delegates the defining to another branch. 
A. Define Power Applied to Other Parts of the Same Section 
The term “define” is not used in the Constitution except in the Define 
and Punish Clause. However, an informative but surprisingly overlooked 
source for understanding the power with respect to offenses can be found in 
the application of “define” to other parts of the same clause. Presumably, 
the word “define” transitively conveys the same power in regard to all three 
kinds of crimes in the section.217 This provides a significant source of 
evidence for the scope of “define” in relation to offenses. While courts have 
never ruled on the validity of congressional defining with respect to 
offenses, there are several important decisions on these questions 
 
215  Cf. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005) 
(arguing that multiple alternate holdings are not dicta). 
216  See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 163–81 (examining whether a statute criminalizing “piracy” 
properly defines the crime of piracy and holding that the statutory offense was piracy “as defined by the 
law of nations, so as to be punishable under the act of Congress”). 
217  The Supreme Court itself has cited United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, a case about 
the defining of piracy, in cases about the Offenses power. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
732 (2004). Compare Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of 
Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149 (2003) (defending an interpretation of intrasentence 
uniformity for applying “regulate Commerce” to the three components of the commerce power), with 
Adrian Vermeule, Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1175 (2003) (arguing that 
different standards for different parts of the commerce power would not be objectionable). The 
presumption of a single meaning for “define” would be stronger than for a single meaning for 
“Commerce” because Commerce is repeated three times in different configurations (“with” foreign 
nations and Indian tribes but “among” states), whereas “define” appears in the provision once and is 
applied transitively to three subjects. 
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concerning piracies and felonies, some from the constitutional luminaries of 
the early Republic. 
1. Limits on Definitions of Piracy.—The Supreme Court dealt 
directly with the limits on defining in relation to piracy, which itself is a 
part of the law of nations.218 If Congress can define the latter without 
restriction, one would think it can also do so with the former: The greater 
power includes the lesser.219 In the first Crimes Act, Congress punished 
piracy as understood in the law of nations: robbery on the high seas.220 Yet 
the same provision identified conduct beyond piracy and seemed to extend 
universal jurisdiction to other conduct—most saliently murder—that in 
almost all views would not be international piracy. Soon after the Act was 
passed, Justice James Wilson, in a series of grand jury charges, expressed 
great doubt that Congress could define certain conduct as a piracy if it 
would not fall within the international legal definition.221 John Marshall 
expanded upon these doubts in his historic speech in the John Robbins 
affair, arguing Congress could not define things as piracies if they did not 
have that status in international law.222 It bears noting that this was not 
Congress calling apples anchovies; there was some authority, though thin, 
for the notion that any kind of unauthorized private attacks on the high seas 
would be piracy.223 
The Supreme Court did not have an opportunity to decide the question 
for twenty years, but when it did, it embraced Marshall’s earlier, narrow 
approach to the Offenses Clause. In United States v. Furlong, the Court 
insisted that Congress cannot punish murder as piracy when the offense 
would not be recognized as such by international law224: “[T]he law declares 
murder to be piracy. These are things so essentially different in their nature, 
 
218  See James Madison in the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 3 Farrand, supra note 69, at 
332. “Piracy” was singled out from “Offences” not because the define power applies differently to it, but 
to make clear that Congress could not apply its unique universal jurisdiction status to law of nations 
violations. Kontorovich, Define and Punish, supra note 21. 
219  One might think the define power would be narrower as applied to piracy because that particular 
crime had a singular, well-known definition, as Justice Story noted in Smith. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 156. 
This is unlike law of nations offenses in general, which were “vague.” 2 Farrand, supra note 69, at 614–
15. Yet this begs the question why Congress was given the power to define it. Moreover, Clause Ten 
speaks of “Piracies,” suggesting things could be added to the list. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
220  See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 158 (citing the First Crimes Act of 1790). 
221  See James Wilson’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia 
(May 23, 1791), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 127, at 178; see also Kontorovich, 
Define and Punish, supra note 21, at 176–78. 
222  See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 607 (1800); see also Kontorovich, Define and Punish, supra note 21, 
at 184. 
223  See Kontorovich, Define and Punish, supra note 21, at 177–78, 180 (describing views of Justice 
Iredell and Attorney General Lee that murder was included in the law of nations concept of piracy). 
224  United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 198 (1820). 
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that not even the omnipotence of legislative power can confound or identify 
them.”225 
Furlong involved a murder on a foreign vessel, and thus could not be 
reached through the broader felonies power. Though the plain language of 
the statute seemed to apply to such a case, the Court read it artificially 
narrowly, holding that Congress only meant to punish murder on U.S. 
vessels where this could be done by defining it as a felony, not a piracy. Yet 
the decision was manifestly motivated by constitutional concerns. Allowing 
murder to be defined as piracy would exceed “the punishing power of 
Congress.”226 The Court understood the define power narrowly both as a 
textual matter—defining implies fidelity to the real world—and based on a 
broader concern about conferring on Congress a power that would in effect 
be limitless: “If by calling murder piracy, it might assert a jurisdiction over 
that offence committed by a foreigner in a foreign vessel, what offence 
might not be brought within their power by the same device?”227 
The same concerns would obviously apply a fortiori to offenses 
against the law of nations. If by calling things an offense against the law of 
nations Congress could punish such conduct without a foreign or interstate 
commerce nexus, there would be no real limit on Congress’s legislative 
powers. Indeed, if the define power is not limited by preexisting 
international law, it would surely be Congress’s broadest, most far-reaching 
Article I power. It would be exceedingly odd that such a vast grant of 
authority over individuals, unchecked by any limiting principle, would exist 
in the Constitution, or that it would have gone unnoted at the convention 
and ratification debates. 
2. Limits on Definitions for High Seas Felonies.—The provision for 
felonies on the high seas uses two terms created by external bodies of law. 
“Felony” is a concept originally from British common law, while the “high 
seas” also comes from the law of nations.228 Thus, like “offenses,” both 
terms raise the question of whether Congress can define outside the bounds 
created by the external body of law to which these terms refer. Though the 
issue has received little attention, several important early authorities 
regarded “Felony” as an external limitation on the kind of crimes Congress 
could define. 
 
225  Id. 
226  Id. at 197. 
227  Id. at 198 (emphasis added). 
228  There is some question as to whether the “high seas” is used in its international legal sense as 
referring to waters free for international navigation, or perhaps as another British legal concept, referring 
to the jurisdiction of the maritime and admiralty courts. See Statement of Mr. Webster on the Judiciary 
(Jan. 10, 1825), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 478 (raising the question of “[w]hether the 
Constitution uses the term ‘high seas’ in its strictly technical sense, or in a sense more enlarged”); 
3 Farrand, supra note 69, at 332 (noting that “Felony” comes from British law and “Piracy” from the 
law of nations, but not mentioning the external source of “high seas”). 
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The 1800 case of The Ulysses was the first time the scope of the 
felonies power received judicial treatment. The issue was whether Congress 
could punish a misdemeanor under the felonies power. The case attracted a 
great deal of attention at the time because of its sensational facts—
involving the rebellion of a ship’s crew against a sadistic and erratic 
captain—and “the most eminent counsel of that day were engaged on either 
side.”229 One of the defense lawyers, Theophilus Parsons, argued that the 
charged offense of “confining the captain of a vessel” was not a felony and 
thus could not be constitutionally punished by Congress. In arguing in the 
presence of the jury that the law exceeded Congress’s constitutional power, 
he played up his history as an early and wholehearted Federalist230: 
 This prosecution is founded on a law of congress, but I do not fear the 
accusation of want of attachment to the federal government by asserting, that 
the clause of the act, on which the indictment is founded, is unconstitutional. I 
have been accused of the wish to elevate that power on the ruins of the state 
government. This I disavow. 
 . . . . 
 . . . Is the offence, with which the defendants stand charged, 
felony? . . . [Parsons argues that it is not.] Congress has power, by the 
constitution, to define and punish all piracies and felonies on the high seas. If 
this offence is neither piracy nor felony, congress had no jurisdiction, and 
therefore this clause is unconstitutional.231 
The U.S. Attorney, Harrison Gray Otis,232 did not dispute this basic 
proposition, but rather argued that the conduct was indeed felonious. At one 
point, Otis seemed to suggest that Congress could make something a felony 
by calling it such (similar to the broad view of the Offenses power): 
 This question [of whether the offense was a felony] called forth much 
learning and ingenuity. The etymology of the word was investigated. It was 
further suggested by Mr. Otis, that congress having power to define and punish 
felonies on the high seas, it was to be supposed, that when legislating on this 
offence, they were legislating on a felony. 
Mr. Parsons[:] That is, because congress is legislating on an offence, it is 
felony. It is a pernicious doctrine.233 
 
229  The Ulysses, 24 F. Cas. 515, 516 (C.C.D. Mass. 1800) (No. 14,330). It should be noted that the 
case has never been cited by other decisions. 
230  See Ulysses, 24 F. Cas. at 517; THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS, 
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 103, 132 (Boston, Ticknor & 
Fields 1859). 
231  Ulysses, 24 F. Cas. at 517. Parsons had been a major figure in the Massachusetts Ratifying 
Convention for the federal constitution and was an author of one of the original proposals for a Bill of 
Rights. See PARSONS, supra note 230, at 55, 65–70. 
232  Otis was a former U.S. Representative, future senator, and nephew of Framer James Otis. 
233  Ulysses, 24 F. Cas. at 518. 
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At this point, the court cut Otis off, noting that it “thought this doctrine 
strained.”234 The court’s ruling rejected Otis’s broad assertion of 
congressional power.235 It ruled that the crime was not a felony but rather a 
misdemeanor and thus could not constitutionally be punished by Congress 
under Clause Ten.236 This provides fairly good evidence for a narrow 
conception of the define power by judges in the early Republic.237 
If anything, one would think that the define power might be broader 
when applied to felonies than to international law concepts in Clause Ten. 
“Felony” is internal to the American legal system. Unlike the law of 
nations, it is not largely determined by forces apart from and outside the 
United States. “Felony” does come from common law, but Congress can 
also pass laws in derogation of the common law. Otis’s implicit 
understanding that Congress can “upgrade” offenses to felonies can only be 
resisted through great formalism. 
Several prominent early jurists also understood the define power as 
being limited by felonies. In 1825, Daniel Webster said in a speech before 
the House of Representatives: 
 Many things are directed to be punished, in the act of 1800, on the high 
seas, which are neither piracies nor felonies, although the 
Constitution . . . restricts it to piracies and felonies, which would infer that the 
Constitution was then held to grant larger power by the other clause 
[concerning Admiralty jurisdiction].238 
 
234  Id. at 518–19. At this point, it is not clear whether the strained doctrine is Otis’s “pernicious 
doctrine” or Parsons’s description of it. 
235  Id. at 519. The bench consisted of William Cushing, formerly the vice president of 
Massachusetts’s constitutional Ratifying Convention and one of the first Supreme Court justices, and 
John Lowell (progenitor of the illustrious Boston Lowells), a district and later chief circuit judge who 
had played an important role in drafting the 1779 Massachusetts constitution and served in various 
political and judicial roles under the Continental Congress. 
236  Id. This did not help the defendants much, as the court ruled that misdemeanors could be 
reached through the foreign commerce power. Id. (“They thought, however, that the clause in the law, 
on which the indictment was found, was not unconstitutional, because in the enumeration of the powers 
of congress, they are to take care of foreign commerce, and to pass all laws necessary for that 
purpose.”). In the given case, the vessel itself was directly engaged in foreign commerce. For other high 
seas misdemeanors, the admiralty jurisdiction could provide the necessary constitutional authority. See 
Statement of Mr. Webster on the Judiciary (Jan. 10, 1825), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 131, at 
478–79. 
237  The same question arose in a circuit court case forty-three years later, but the court was 
apparently unaware of The Ulysses. See United States v. Crawford, 25 F. Cas. 692, 693–94 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 14,890) (noting, incorrectly, that “there is no express adjudication on this 
subject”). Crawford was also a case of shipboard rebellion. The misdemeanor argument was again 
raised. The court responded that since the First Congress, many federal high seas criminal statutes 
applied to what would have been misdemeanors at common law, and it would hardly be appropriate to 
find them all unconstitutional without direction from the Supreme Court. Id. The court neglected to 
consider the other Article I bases for those laws. 
238  Statement of Mr. Webster on the Judiciary (Jan. 10, 1825), in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 
131, at 479 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, in that same year, in one of the few direct statements on the 
meaning of the define power made by early commentators, William Rawle 
suggested that the word was “introduced to authorize congress to qualify 
and reduce the acts” that in English common law constituted a felony.239 
Rawle saw the define power as absolutely limited by an external body of 
law (the common law), and the point of the define power would be to let 
Congress selectively codify and incorporate it. While the policy 
considerations for rejecting common law felonies may be stronger than for 
rejecting law of nations offenses, Rawle still saw “define” as a word of 
limitation and selection, not of creation and expansion. As these important 
early interpreters understood it, the define and punish power imposed rigid 
limits on Congress, determined by preexisting legal categories, which the 
legislature could not simply write its way around. 
Whether Congress could expand the international legal definition of 
“high seas” is an even more obscure question with almost no consideration. 
This may be because of uncertainty during the Founding Era regarding 
precisely what waters the high seas referred to,240 or because Congress’s 
implied admiralty power has been interpreted to apply even outside the high 
seas, and thus makes the precise limits of the latter less relevant. If one 
adopted a broad view of the define power, Congress could define a local 
pond or a deep pool to be the high seas. However, the Supreme Court has 
suggested that regardless of congressional definitions, the felonies power 
only applies on the high seas as objectively understood.241 Recently, the 
federal government has begun applying the anti-drug trafficking laws inside 
foreign territorial waters. Though courts had previously described the 
relevant statutes as exercises of the felonies power, its application beyond 
the high seas has led them to recast it as Offenses Clause legislation.242 
Though the international crime argument is quite strained,243 it is 
noteworthy that this was preferred to allowing a broad notion of defining 
the “high seas,” as the latter is much more precisely defined in the 
contemporary law of nations. 
 
239  RAWLE, supra note 120, at 107. 
240  Common questions involved river mouths, bays, and the like. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Henry, 1 
U.S. (1 Dall.) 49, 49–50 (1780) (“There has been great debate as to what is meant by high seas.”). 
241  See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155–56 (1933) (assuming the felonies power could 
not apply beyond the high seas, but holding that the admiralty power was not limited to high seas). The 
assumption that any congressional power over U.S. vessels in foreign waters would stem from the 
admiralty rather than the felonies power dates back much earlier. See Kontorovich, Beyond Article I, 
supra note 28, at 1235 (showing how both parties in an 1820 case apparently agreed that the felonies 
power could not reach beyond the high seas as generally understood). 
242  United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1349, 1352–53 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
243  See Kontorovich, Beyond Article I, supra note 28, at 1224–26 (demonstrating that drug 
trafficking is not an international law offense). 
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B. Counterfeiting: Arjona 
The Supreme Court’s first encounter with the Offenses Clause—and its 
last major statement for more than half a century—came in United States v. 
Arjona,244 which involved an 1884 statute criminalizing the counterfeiting 
of foreign currency and corporate securities. Arjona remains the leading 
Offenses Clause case, mostly for lack of competition.245 The case sets out a 
broader conception of offenses and a more deferential approach to defining 
than suggested by the original meaning, which the opinion does not engage. 
1. Background.—Arjona came in the wake of the Legal Tender 
Cases, which upheld the issuance of paper money in peacetime and reflect 
concern about the vulnerability of such instruments.246 The law protecting 
foreign currency and corporate securities had been introduced in Congress 
just a few years earlier, in 1882.247 The measure was urged by the State 
Department,248 which had been petitioned for years by South American 
countries complaining that the United States had become “a harbor for these 
gangs of counterfeiters.”249 While it was easy to see how such a law would 
be a good idea, further consideration in the Judiciary Committee revealed 
significant doubts about the Article I basis for the statute under the 
Counterfeiting Clause. In a report, the Committee explained that the 
Offenses Clause was “the only other clause of the Constitution under which 
the power asserted by the bill [could] be claimed.”250 
The Committee proceeded to set forth a broad vision of the Offenses 
power that justified the law. It recognized that an individual violates the law 
of nations by counterfeiting foreign currency. The committee went further, 
 
244  120 U.S. 479 (1887). 
245  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld may be at least as important an Offenses Clause precedent, but because its 
ruling on the Offenses Clause was implicit, it has not yet attained the same influence. 548 U.S. 557 
(2006). 
246  See Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884); Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). 
247  See 47th Congress—First Session, BALT. SUN, Jan. 28, 1882, at 4 (reporting on introduction of 
counterfeiting bill). Similar legislation had been proposed a few years earlier. See Forty-Fifth 
Congress—Third Session, BALT. SUN, Jan. 23, 1879, at 4. 
248  H.R. REP. NO. 47-1835 (1882) (“[C]omity between nations should impel us to enact some such 
legislation.”). 
249  2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL 
DISCUSSION OF ITS GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION § 279 (Henry St. George Tucker 
ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1899) [hereinafter TUCKER, CRITICAL DISCUSSION]. 
250  H.R. REP. NO. 48-1329, at 1 (1884). This assertion is surprising and is explored further infra Part 
III.B.4. The Committee’s concern may have been motivated by United States v. Marigold, which took a 
rigidly literal approach to the Counterfeiting Clause. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850). While the Court 
suggested it would be plausible to read the Counterfeiting Clause as also extending to the importation or 
circulation of previously counterfeited U.S. currency (as opposed to actually making it), it ultimately 
rested on the coining power. Id. at 568 (holding that it would not be “necessary or regular to seek the 
foundation of the offence of circulating spurious coin, or for the origin of the right to punish that offence 
[in the Counterfeiting Clause]” because counterfeit connotes fabrication, not importation). 
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claiming that the Offenses Clause covers any conduct that could seriously 
damage the foreign relations of the United States: 
 It seems to your committee to be clear that the Constitution vests in 
Congress power to define and punish as offenses against the law of nations, 
everything which is done by a citizen of the United States hostile to the 
peaceful relations between them and foreign nations, or which is contrary to 
the integrity of the foreign country in its essential sovereignty, or which would 
disturb its peace and security. Such an act done directly by the Government of 
the United States would be a legitimate cause of complaint, and unless 
redressed, of war. It is the duty of the Government to prevent any 
act . . . which would produce the same effect . . . .251 
In other words, the question is not whether the conduct is treated as 
criminal in international law, but whether it “offends” other nations in the 
colloquial sense. The apparently odd test of whether such an act would be 
an offense if done by the government refers to a passage in Vattel that a 
nation “makes [an] act its own” if it “approves and ratifies the act 
committed by a citizen.”252 
Though the Framers did see the Offenses Clause as a way of dealing 
with injuries to aliens and foreign states for which the country as a whole 
would be held responsible, it is highly uncertain whether they meant it to 
cover any and all such conduct. The Committee did not discuss originalist 
sources, instead relying primarily on logical and structural inferences for its 
view. The federal government is entrusted by the Constitution with the 
principal powers of foreign relations. And the federal government will be 
held accountable by other nations for all harms emanating from its 
jurisdiction, whether they are treated as criminal by the law of nations or 
not. Surely that national authority must have some means of preventing 
such wrongs within its jurisdiction—and the Offenses power seemed like a 
good fit.253 
The Committee briefly suggested a longstanding precedent—
extradition—in support of its broad interpretation of the Offenses power.254 
Like the foreign counterfeiting law, extradition of felons is also designed to 
keep the United States from becoming a haven for criminals against foreign 
countries. But while extradition involves international law issues, it had 
never been thought to be an exercise of Offenses power. To the contrary, it 
had almost always been done in pursuance of particular treaty provisions.255 
 
251  H.R. REP. NO. 48-1329, at 2. 
252  Id. at 3 (quoting 2 VATTEL, supra note 91, § 74). 
253  Id. at 4. 
254  Id. at 3. 
255  The case relied on by the committee makes this clear. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 
540, 569 (1840). The precise constitutional pedigree of extradition—what allows the rendition of a 
citizen upon relatively slight proof and without any benefit of a jury—remains mysterious. See generally 
106:1675 (2012) Law of Nations Clause 
 1727
In the subsequent litigation, the Government also invoked an additional 
precedent, that of neutrality from the early Republic, which also has an 
uncertain Offenses Clause pedigree.256 
The Government’s argument before the Supreme Court in Arjona 
largely built on the justifications in the Committee report, with a few 
elaborations. It suggested another precedent—the Neutrality Act of 1794.257 
This example, unlike extradition, was invoked by the Court—the only 
precedent it mentioned.258 Neutrality was, like the counterfeiting law, 
designed to prevent citizens from annoying or provoking hostilities with 
foreign nations. The Attorney General asserted that neutrality law was 
premised on the Offenses Clause.259 Yet it is not clear that the Neutrality 
Laws, before Arjona, were ever regarded as exercises of the Offenses 
power. Congress did not expressly pass the Neutrality Act as Offenses 
legislation, and several other constitutional powers were more prominently 
invoked, notably the treaty and war powers.260 Indeed, since the 
counterfeiting act was also justified, at least rhetorically, as aimed at 
preventing wars,261 one would think it too could be justified under the war 
power.262 
2. Arjona on “Offences”.—Two features of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion demand attention. It gave broad scope to congressional definitions 
of offenses, requiring no state practice or much else to justify a putative 
norm that fell within the scope of “Offences.” Further, it gave the concept 
of offenses a broad scope, including conduct that implicates the 
 
Kontorovich, International Courts, supra note 207, at 109–10 (discussing how extradition was also 
suggested in the 1860s as a precedent for submitting Americans for trial before international courts). 
256  See supra text accompanying notes 165–85. 
257  Brief for Plaintiff at 19–20, United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887) (No. 86-1100). It was 
not explained why the Neutrality Acts were so obviously offenses laws, and this is not how they had 
been generally understood in the intervening century. See H.R. REP. NO. 39-100, at 2 (1866): 
The act of 1794 was not passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution making it the 
duty of Congress to punish offences against the laws of nations. It was entitled, “An act to punish 
offences against the laws of the United States;” offences not found in previous legislation of this or 
other nations, but mainly created by the act itself. 
258  United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887). It played an even greater role in the earlier 
ruling in United States v. White, 27 F. 200, 202 (1886): 
Our statutes are full of laws designed to prevent wrongs done by our citizens to foreign nations, or 
citizens thereof; some punish the forming of insurrectionary expeditions here with a view of 
invading foreign nations, and thus tend to preserve the peace and harmony between nations. 
259  Brief for Plaintiff at 19–20, Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (No. 86-1100). 
260  See supra notes 173–85 and accompanying text. 
261  H.R. REP. NO. 48-1329, at 2 (1884); Brief for Plaintiff at 15, Arjona 120 U.S. 479 (No. 86-
1100). 
262  Perhaps Congress thought that the “dormant war power” justification for the Neutrality Act had 
never been too convincing or realized, as the Court would conclude, that the threat of a counterfeiting 
war was a bit far-fetched. See Arjona, 120 U.S. at 487 (noting that unchecked counterfeiting “may not, 
perhaps, furnish sufficient cause for war, but it would certainly give just ground of complaint”). 
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international legal obligations of the United States, even if it does not 
constitute an individual violation of international law. 
The national government is . . . made responsible to foreign nations for all 
violations by the United States of their international obligations, and because 
of this, Congress is expressly authorized “to define and punish . . . offences 
against the law of nations.” 
 The law of nations requires every national government to use “due 
diligence” to prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another 
nation with which it is at peace, or to the people thereof; and because of this 
the obligation of one nation to punish those who within its own jurisdiction 
counterfeit the money of another nation has long been recognized.263 
The Court did not consider any of the originalist evidence about the 
purposes of the Clause. It is surely true that the motivation for the provision 
was to allow the United States to satisfy its international legal obligations. 
The question would be whether this power goes beyond punishing those 
who actually violate the law of nations. Yet if some conduct triggers 
national responsibility but not individual culpability, there would be a gap 
in federal power to ensure compliance with national obligations and avoid 
reprisal. The Court found no justification for such a gap: 
A right secured by the law of nations to a nation . . . is one the United States as 
the representatives of this nation are bound to protect. Consequently, a law 
which is necessary and proper to afford this protection is one that Congress 
may enact, because it is one that is needed to carry into execution a power 
conferred by the Constitution on the Government of the United States 
exclusively. There is no authority in the United States to require the passage 
and enforcement of such a law by the states. Therefore the United States must 
have the power to pass it and enforce it themselves, or be unable to perform a 
duty which they may owe to another nation . . . .264 
The Court’s opinion echoes a passage, quoted in the Attorney 
General’s brief,265 from Story’s Commentaries, which contains what seems 
the first appearance of the broad view of the Offenses power:266 
As the United States are responsible to foreign governments for all violations 
of the law of nations, and as the welfare of the Union is essentially connected 
with the conduct of our citizens in regard to foreign nations, congress ought to 
possess the power to define and punish all such offences, which may interrupt 
our intercourse and harmony with, and our duties to them.267 
 
263  Id. at 483–84 (citation omitted). 
264  Id. at 487. 
265  Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (No. 86-1100). 
266  See Fredman, supra note 25, at 291. 
267  STORY, supra note 48, § 1160, at 57–58. 
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Story does not explain this position, but it may not require so much 
explanation. First, unlike in the Attorney General’s subsequent rephrasing, 
Story here describes this power as only extending to offenses that harm 
foreign relations—as opposed to any conduct that disturbs international 
harmony. Second, in the sentence immediately preceding, Story speaks of 
the Offenses power as intertwined with the foreign commerce and war 
powers, and the provocative passage quoted by the Attorney General seems 
to refer generally to the sum total of these powers.268 In other words, the 
quoted passage describes the sum of the powers conveyed by these several 
provisions, not the particular power of the Offenses Clause. The narrow 
understanding of the quoted language is confirmed by the fact that Story 
wrote or participated in Furlong and Smith, important early cases that 
strongly implied that Congress could not define as piracy that which was 
not treated as such in international law. 
Arjona goes well beyond international crimes, extending to any 
domestic conduct that could vex or offend foreign powers.269 This covers all 
conceivable conduct, including things not tortious at all. For example, 
refusal to rent premises to a country or criticisms of its government in 
judicial opinions could all threaten good relations. Yet one thing that seems 
clear from the originalist materials is that the Offenses power is limited to 
offenses already established in the law of nations. Even if Congress can 
define them broadly or in advance of consensus, there would still be some 
preexisting, limited universe of punishable offenses. In the broadest Arjona 
formulation, it is solely the reaction of the foreign country, not the nature of 
the conduct, that allows for Offenses legislation. 
The Court’s broad conception of offenses seems strained. Vattel and 
similar authorities distinguish between offenses by individuals and offenses 
by nations of the kind the Court focuses on in Arjona. According to Vattel, 
a country does not violate the law of nations whenever its nationals injure 
foreigners. Only when the country implicitly ratifies the conduct—by 
failing to compensate the victim, make diplomatic amends, or extradite or 
punish the perpetrator—does an offense occur. Other wrongs (piracy, 
assaults on ambassadors) are immediately offenses. The Constitution 
authorizes Congress to punish offenses, which seems to assume that the 
violations have already been consummated. This understanding does not 
 
268  For these propositions, Story relied on St. George Tucker’s commentary on Blackstone. Id. 
§ 1160, at 57 n.1. Tucker describes “offences” as primarily including the Blackstone troika and uses this 
juncture to point out the “very guarded manner in which congress are vested [by the Constitution] with 
authority to legislate upon the subject of crimes.” TUCKER, supra note 48, at 269. He does not mention 
the Neutrality Act as an example of Offenses legislation. All this seems quite inconsistent with Arjona’s 
effort to cast Story’s views as presaging its holding. 
269  See TUCKER, CRITICAL DISCUSSION, supra note 249, § 279, at 575 (interpreting Arjona as 
holding—correctly in Tucker’s view—that an infringement of the “rights of other nations” amounts to 
the same thing as a violation of the law of nations for purposes of the Offenses Clause). 
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permit Congress to deter or prevent nonexistent offenses.270 Finally, if the 
principal offender is the United States, it is also hard to understand how the 
federal government can punish itself. 
3. Arjona on “Defining”.—To properly understand Arjona, it is 
crucial to understand the narrowness of the issues argued on appeal. The 
defendants did not take issue with the Government’s broad characterization 
of the Offenses power as applying to conduct for which the Government is 
legally responsible, nor did they choose to contest the offenses status of 
counterfeiting foreign currency. Instead, they argued on the narrowest—and 
seemingly safest—grounds: that international law only required 
governments to act against counterfeiting of foreign currency but not 
foreign private securities.271 The latter does not involve the proprietary 
interests of foreign states and is simply a private tort. The argument seems 
solid; the relevant passages in Vattel refer only to public issues. Moreover, 
no cases can be found in which someone was punished for counterfeiting 
private securities as an offense against the law of nations. 
To be sure, such counterfeiting can be offensive to the foreign nation 
and can even provoke a war. But so can a wide variety of other conduct, 
such as libelous newspaper articles or even the control of resources abroad 
by one’s nationals. While every offense against the law of nations may be a 
casus belli, not every casus belli is an offense against the law of nations. 
There appears to have been no international practice treating securities 
forgery as an offense against the law of nations. Yet the Court accepted this 
definition based solely on logic and not on any analysis of existing 
international sources. Counterfeiting foreign securities implicates the same 
policies as counterfeiting foreign currency, which the defendant (and Vattel, 
the only source cited by the Court) agreed was a real offense. It seems odd 
that Vattel’s highly normative work could be taken as a guide to 
international custom 150 years later. Thus, Arjona’s approach represents 
perhaps the greatest possible degree of deference to Congress: little or no 
external corroboration or precedent is required to support a definition so 
long as the conduct is somewhat related to conduct that in the view of at 
least some authorities is governed by international law. Indeed, considering 
counterfeiting foreign securities a definable offense simply because it 
implicates the same policies as actual offenses comes close to allowing 
Congress to make rather than take the law of nations. 
In fairness, the Court’s approach may not have been quite as cavalier 
as the opinion itself suggests. The briefs referred to a wider array of 
sources. While the Attorney General cited Vattel primarily and most 
extensively, he also marshaled contemporary authorities such as Francis 
 
270  This is not to say that prophylaxis may not be a necessary and proper means of carrying out the 
power, especially if subsequent remedies would be inadequate. 
271  Brief for Defendant at 7, United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887) (No. 86-1100). 
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Wharton and the draft international legal code by David Dudley Field.272 
The Government also cited at some length the laws of numerous other 
countries that punish foreign currency counterfeiting (though without any 
showing that they treat these as international offenses or punish them out of 
international obligation).273 Thus, while the Court illustrated its opinion 
simply through Vattel, it may have just picked out the authority it found 
most decisive, though this would not have been sufficient to establish the 
point. 
4. Alternate Constitutional Grounds.—It is not clear why the 
enforcement gap the Court feared would exist. Even under the doctrines of 
Vattel that the Court cited, individual conduct only gets imputed to the 
sovereign if the sovereign implicitly endorses the conduct by not punishing, 
extraditing, paying restitution, or otherwise making amends. Thus, until the 
United States fails to make diplomatic amends, one is quite far from an 
“offense” even in the loose usage of the Court. And the punishment of 
individuals is not essential to avoiding national responsibility. Moreover, 
other legislative powers are available to address such concerns, in 
particular, the Foreign Commerce Clause, which the Framers saw as being 
equally important to ensuring that private or state actors did not embroil the 
nation in diplomatic difficulties. 
A puzzling aspect of Arjona is that both Congress and the Court 
thought the Offenses power was the only possible Article I basis for the 
law. They read all other congressional powers narrowly but construed 
offenses broadly. The reluctance to invoke more directly relevant Article I 
powers stemmed from the explicit power over counterfeiting U.S. currency, 
which was thought to rule out such a power with respect to foreign currency 
through expressio unius.274 Yet the Court itself noted that a principal reason 
for punishing counterfeiters of foreign currency is to protect U.S. money 
from similar treatment abroad.275 Thus, one might think it could be a 
necessary and proper adjunct to the Counterfeiting Clause. 
Today, the measure would be easily justified as a regulation of foreign 
commerce—which printing currency certainly affects. One might think that 
in an era of narrower notions of commerce, people were unsure whether the 
 
272  See Brief for Plaintiff at 11, 17, Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (No. 86-1100). 
273  Id. at 15–17. 
274  At the Constitutional Convention, during the discussion of the counterfeiting provision, someone 
suggested foreign currency be included as well. The suggestion was not acted on. See Fredman, supra 
note 25, at 294 & n.60 (noting that this episode was never discussed in any of the cases interpreting the 
1884 Act). This could suggest the Framers thought it implicit in the counterfeiting power, or perhaps 
some other one. 
275  Arjona, 120 U.S. at 486–87 (“But if the United States can require [other countries to prohibit 
counterfeiting U.S. paper] of another, that other may require it of them, because international obligations 
are of necessity reciprocal in their nature.”). 
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mere manufacture of such currency was enough to fall within the Clause.276 
Yet the Court specifically referred to foreign notes as “form[ing] part of the 
foreign commerce of the country,”277 and it discussed the great effect such 
counterfeiting can have on U.S. economic relations with other countries.278 
Indeed, the Court began its discussion by invoking the Foreign Commerce 
Clause, the Declare War Clause, the federal treaty power, and other powers 
over foreign relations, including the Offenses Clause.279 All these, taken 
together, show that “[t]he national government is . . . made responsible to 
foreign nations for all violations by the United States of their international 
obligations, and because of this, Congress is expressly authorized ‘to define 
and punish . . . offences against the law of nations.’”280 The recitation of all 
these powers suggests a penumbra-type argument, one of general federal 
foreign relations powers. Thus, it is not the Offenses Clause itself that is 
doing the work, but the sum total of federal powers in the international 
realm (similarly, this is one of the explanations for the Neutrality Acts).281 
In effect, the Court said that the law falls under the Offenses Clause because 
it involves foreign commerce. It used an Offenses Clause label for Foreign 
Commerce reasoning. The implicit existence of other overlapping Article I 
grounds may account for the Court’s casual treatment of the Offenses 
issues. 
5. “Offences” and Changes in the Law of Nations.—Arjona’s 
approach was very heavily influenced by Vattel’s expansive notion of state 
responsibility, which could potentially make a wide array of individual 
conduct an international offense on the part of the perpetrator’s country. 
This suggests that Arjona’s holding may have little significance for 
understanding the Offenses Clause today. One aspect of the Clause on 
which there is broad agreement is that the law of nations is not locked in to 
1789, but expands or contracts to track developments in international law.282 
The need for adaptability was already suggested in Congress’s 1781 
report.283 This is the only sensible reading of the provision; it would hardly 
help avoid international retaliation to allow Congress to deal with 
antiquated offenses but not the ones nations actually care about today. Just 
 
276  See, e.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that the manufacture of 
sugar by a national monopolist could not be regulated under Commerce Clause). 
277  Arjona, 120 U.S. at 487 (discussing how foreign notes are “brought here in the course of our 
commerce with foreign nations, or sent here from abroad for sale in the money markets of this 
country”). 
278  Id. at 484–85. 
279  Id. at 483. 
280  Id. 
281  Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 
111 YALE L.J. 231, 353 n.538 (2001). 
282  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004) (holding that the ATS allows for causes 
of action “based on the present-day law of nations”). 
283  See 21 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 1136 (1781). 
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as the particular substantive content of offenses is not set in stone, neither 
are the background rules, like state responsibility. The law of state 
responsibility has become murky in the twentieth century, but it seems 
likely that the kind of blanket vicarious liability described by Vattel no 
longer applies. A state will not even have international legal responsibility 
if it takes no corrective measures whatsoever.284 Today, ordinary crimes 
against foreigners that constituted most of the offenses of concern to the 
Framers would not be thought of as raising any questions of international 
law or state responsibility. 
Finally, it bears noting that despite the wide breadth of Arjona’s 
conception of offenses, it is also surprisingly underinclusive. Indeed, both 
the ATS and military commissions may fall outside the Arjona model of 
offenses. Rather than seeing the Offenses Clause as being about individual 
violations of international criminal law, Arjona sees it as being about 
punishing conduct by Americans to prevent it from being attributed to the 
United States and thus causing foreign relations problems. Yet the military 
commissions punish crimes by foreigners against Americans abroad. 
Certainly other nations could not take offense if the United States is lenient 
in prosecuting those who injure it. Furthermore, many ATS cases are about 
offenses involving foreigners abroad, which may actually be violations of 
international law and may even be universally cognizable but in no way 
trigger the responsibility of the United States. 
C. Protecting Ambassadors and Embassies 
Some discussion of the Offenses Clause and its historic backdrop 
occurred in Boos v. Barry,285 which some scholars believe gives broad scope 
to the Clause.286 However, the case did not actually involve any question 
about the extent of the define Offenses power. Rather, it involved a narrow 
and modest use of the power in its most well-established function: 
diplomatic protection. 
The case involved a statute prohibiting picketing and protests within 
500 feet of embassies in Washington, D.C.287 The statute’s validity as an 
exercise of Congress’s powers over the federal district,288 and additionally, 
as an exercise of the Offenses Clause, had been established by the D.C. 
 
284  See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with 
Commentaries, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 38, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001) (“[T]he conduct of private persons is not as such attributable to the State.”). 
285  485 U.S. 312 (1988); see also Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (discussing how the Offenses 
Clause was created to ensure the United States could meet its international law obligations). 
286  See Stephens, supra note 23, at 477. 
287  Boos, 485 U.S. at 315. 
288  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
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Circuit a half century earlier in Frend v. United States.289 In that decision, 
the D.C. Circuit focused on the fact that Congress had discussed the 
measure as implementing international law obligations.290 Frend did little 
more than Arjona to measure the law against the law of nations. It simply 
cited Vattel and the Harvard Research Draft on the immunity question.291 
But unlike the law in Arjona, it was not a close question: the immunity of 
ambassadors had provided much of the original motivation for the Offenses 
Clause.292 There was no suggestion that the norm had disappeared since the 
Founding.293 The necessary and proper power would allow for the broader 
protection afforded by the protest ban, on the theory that protests outside a 
foreign legation can easily escalate to manifest violations, like violence. 
The only question considered by the Supreme Court in Boos was 
whether the statute—whose Article I pedigree was assumed—violated the 
First Amendment.294 While Boos discussed the importance of the Offenses 
power at some length, the Court’s attention to the Clause was not to define 
its scope, but rather to suggest the magnitude of the governmental interest 
that must be balanced against the First Amendment’s protection of speech. 
Nonetheless, the Court ultimately found the picketing restriction 
unconstitutional, not because Congress exceeded its Offenses authority, but 
because all Article I powers (like the treaty power) do not authorize 
overriding individuals’ constitutional rights.295 
D. Military Commissions 
After Arjona, the Court’s next exploration of the Offenses Clause came 
seventy years later, during the Second World War, in a pair of cases 
involving the war crimes trials before military commissions, convened by 
the Commander in Chief.296 Congress had authorized such commissions as a 
supplement to courts martial and limited their jurisdiction to offenses under 
“the law of war,” generally thought to be a “branch” of the law of nations.297 
 
289  100 F.2d 691, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
290  Id. at 693. 
291  Id. at 693 & nn.2–3. The Harvard Research Draft specifically mentioned a duty to “protect the 
premises occupied or used by a mission . . . against any invasion or other act tending to disturb the peace 
or dignity of the mission.” Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 26 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 15, 50 (Supp. 1932). 
292  See Boos, 485 U.S. at 323–24. 
293  The First Congress had barred assaults, as well as suits and arrests against foreign ministers. See 
Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 25–26, 1 Stat. 112, 118. 
294  Boos, 485 U.S at 317–18. 
295  Id. at 324, 329. 
296  See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1942) (considering whether the charged offenses 
against the law of war were in fact violations of the law of war). 
297  Id. at 29. 
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1. World War II Crimes.—In Ex parte Quirin, the now-famous case 
of the German saboteurs who landed on Long Island, the Court held that 
Congress’s authority to create these commissions comes from the Offenses 
Clause. The jurisdiction of such tribunals thus only extends to offenses 
“which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more 
particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.”298 Though 
seemingly continuing Arjona’s deferential approach, the commission cases 
are in several ways in tension with Arjona. 
While Arjona read the Offenses Clause quite broadly, the military 
commissions would not seem to meet Arjona’s test for Offenses legislation. 
If the Offenses Clause extends to “all violations by the United States of 
their international obligations,” or any injury to foreigners for which the 
United States may be held responsible,299 it is hard to understand how it 
could extend to crimes by foreigners against Americans or third-party 
nations. Surely no foreign nation could have a grievance if the United States 
chose not to punish such crimes. Similarly, Arjona’s broad formulation 
might oddly exclude most modern human rights crimes, such as torture of a 
country’s own citizens. While these are offenses that individuals personally 
commit, they do not implicate the foreign relations of the United States in 
the way Arjona described because the norms are fundamentally 
nonreciprocal. Other nations are not likely to torture their own citizens in 
retaliation for the United States doing the same. 
In reviewing the commission cases, the Supreme Court held that 
Congress could not arbitrarily define offenses against international laws of 
war (in Quirin the crime was unlawful belligerency).300 But the Court 
recognized that the parameters of international law could be vague. 
Whether an offense fell within the law of war might be in dispute, with 
varied state practice and scholarly opinion. In such cases, they would fall 
within the Offenses power only if they are “recognized by our courts as 
violations of the law of war . . . .”301 And to that end, the Court launched 
into an eight-page examination of whether the laws of war recognized such 
an offense, delving deeply into U.S. practice in other wars, British War 
Office manuals, relevant treaties, and treatises in several languages.302 
While the Court did not look too much at foreign practice, the extent of the 
analysis is quite notable given that there was no real debate that spies and 
saboteurs violated the laws of war. 
Quirin’s close examination of such an uncontroversial offense might 
suggest a significant role for courts in testing definitions of offenses against 
 
298  Id. at 28. 
299  United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 483 (1887). 
300  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29 (“We must therefore first inquire whether any of the acts charged is an 
offense against the law of war . . . .”). 
301  Id. (emphasis added). 
302  Id. at 30–37. 
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objective external law. This is a fundamentally different attitude from 
Arjona’s deference. However, Quirin did not involve any definition by 
Congress. Rather, the legislature delegated the definition of war crimes 
triable by military commissions to the Commander in Chief.303 Quirin 
reaffirmed the constitutionality of such a delegation by Congress, noting as 
precedent similar delegations: the piracy statute in United States v. Smith, 
and, significantly for our purposes, the Alien Tort Statute.304 Thus, Quirin 
shows that whatever deference is due to congressional definitions, the 
definitions of the other branches will be reviewed for conformity to the 
objective law of nations. 
Despite Quirin’s serious inquiry into whether the charged offense 
constituted a violation of international law, another military commission 
case decided shortly after the war showed that whatever the formal level of 
deference, the content of international law is often indeterminate enough to 
give the courts a great deal of discretion to recognize an offense. In re 
Yamashita involved a Japanese general charged with negligently failing to 
prevent his troops from committing atrocities.305 In explaining its reasoning, 
the Court insisted that it “do[es] not make the laws of war,” but rather only 
follows them.306 However, it confirmed the charge of the military 
commission, which had sentenced the defendant to death for violating an 
affirmative duty to exercise effective control over troops in combat.307 
While this was a much more novel charge, the Court upheld it with some 
general and not quite on-point citations to the Hague Conventions. Two of 
the eight participating Justices dissented and powerfully pointed out these 
weaknesses: 
The recorded annals of warfare and the established principles of international 
law afford not the slightest precedent for such a charge. This indictment in 
effect permitted the military commission to make the crime whatever it 
willed, . . . a practice reminiscent of that pursued in certain less respected 
nations in recent years. 
 . . . . 
 The Court’s reliance upon vague and indefinite references in . . . the Hague 
Conventions and the Geneva Red Cross Convention is misplaced. 
 . . . . 
 The Government [also] claims that the principle that commanders in the 
field are bound to control their troops has been applied so as to impose liability 
 
303  Id. at 28–29 (“Congress . . . has not itself undertaken to codify that branch of international law or 
to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law 
condemns.”). 
304  Id. at 29–30 & n.6. 
305  327 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1946). 
306  Id. at 16. 
307  Id. at 17–18. 
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on the United States in international arbitrations. The difference between 
arbitrating property rights and charging an individual with a crime against the 
laws of war is too obvious to require elaboration.308 
In retrospect it may seem that the charges against General Yamashita 
were a vengeful innovation. Again, the Court in Yamashita gives Congress 
a very free hand in defining so long as the conduct is of the general kind 
that international law might regulate (i.e., the responsibility of military 
officials for the crimes of their subordinates). 
2. The Guantanamo Cases.—Most recently, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
the Court considered whether a military commission created by presidential 
order could try an enemy combatant for conspiracy to commit war crimes.309 
Following Quirin, the Court concluded that the commissions were an 
exercise of the Offenses power and thus could only have authority to try 
war crimes recognized under international law. Yet the Hamdan plurality 
opinion took a far less deferential approach than Arjona. Indeed, it adopted 
a high bar for accepting international offenses: “the precedent must be plain 
and unambiguous.”310 Hamdan’s standard is reminiscent of Sosa’s test for 
customary norms. 
This seems to represent a significant reversal in the Court’s approach 
to testing crimes under the Offenses Clause. Indeed, it echoes the dissent in 
Yamashita and the arguments of Arjona’s counsel, both of whom argued 
that something could hardly be a law of nations offense if no one had ever 
been prosecuted for it under the law of nations (as opposed to various 
municipal laws). This position suggests that to be defined as an offense, it 
had to already be one, and the proof for that is at least some history of 
punishment of the conduct as an offense against the law of nations. 
The plurality carefully considered whether conspiracy was generally 
recognized as a violation of the laws of war, looking closely at U.S. 
practice, international tribunals, and treatises.311 For example, while Quirin 
had involved a conspiracy charge, the Court discounted that precedent 
because the ruling had not specifically addressed the charge. Finding no 
direct precedents, the Hamdan plurality held the offense was not a war 
crime in international law. This is striking because the substantive conduct 
Hamdan was accused of could easily have been a law of war violation, but 
the plurality looked only to the specific name of the charged offense. As 
will be seen in Part IV, the much tougher review conducted in Hamdan can 
be attributed to the delegation of Define Clause authority to the military 
 
308  Id. at 28, 36, 39 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
309  548 U.S. 557, 602–03 (2006). 
310  Id. at 602 (emphasis added); see also Vladeck, supra note 11, at 331. 
311  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 601–12. 
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commissions. As the Court noted, “The elements of this conspiracy charge 
have been defined not by Congress but by the President.”312 
In response to Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, which defined “conspiracy” as an offense against the law of 
nations.313 A further revision of the statute during the Obama 
Administration kept this language.314 Congress apparently understood 
Hamdan as objecting to the delegation of defining authority, and not the 
identification of conspiracy to commit war crimes as a punishable offense 
per se. Otherwise, reenacting an offense identical to one that the Supreme 
Court had just said does not amount to an offense would be the most direct 
disregard for judicial authority, a congressional negation of judicial review. 
Subsequent proceedings in the military commissions have focused 
heavily on whether the terrorism crimes defined by the MCA exceed 
Congress’s Offenses power.315 The commissions have adopted a rather 
broad view of Congress’s power to define offenses. However, this was 
based not only on the Offenses Clause itself, but also on the particular 
discretion the government gets in the area of war—with the war powers 
providing an entirely separate Article I basis for the law—and foreign 
relations. (One might ask whether this discretion would always attach to 
offenses laws, which inherently involve foreign relations matters.)316 
Even with this broad notion of the Offenses power, the commissions 
surveyed international law quite intensively before upholding the MCA. 
The commission opinion in Hamdan spent fourteen pages reviewing the 
criminalization of analogous conduct in international treaties and, of even 
greater importance, in numerous international and foreign courts.317 Thus, 
even with a specific congressional definition, the commissions have sought 
concrete international precedent for treating the defined conduct as an 
offense against the law of nations. One basic test of whether an offense 
 
312  Id. at 598 n.30. Hamdan’s tough approach to offenses may have been additionally motivated by 
the particular context. The define power in Hamdan was used to justify a criminal trial before a non-
Article III court without the benefit of a jury. The Court may have been tempted to limit Congress’s 
discretion more stringently in that context, consistent with the wariness about common law crimes 
embodied in the define power. See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 337–38. 
313  Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(28). 
314  See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190. 
315  See United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1269–70 (C.M.R. 2011) (holding that the 
Offenses Clause does not require “international . . . unanimity” in the definition of a norm for Congress 
to define war crimes, but rather gives Congress broad discretion); Ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss 
Charge One for Failure to State an Offense and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 3–4, United 
States v. Khadr, No. AE 87, D-008 (Apr. 21, 2008) (holding that Congress had a “reasonable basis” to 
define murder as an international crime in violation of the law of war, and that this “was not a decision 
to create a new crime”). 
316  See Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1264–66. 
317  Id. at 1279–92. 
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exists in the law of nations is whether anyone has been punished for it 
outside of the U.S. law in question. 
E. Summary 
The Supreme Court has rarely construed the scope of the Offenses 
power. Arjona presents a broad vision of the power as potentially extending 
to any acts for which the United States would be held accountable by other 
nations, even if they were not international crimes in themselves. It is far 
from clear that such broad language was necessary in the case, and it is 
surprising that the Court went so far in its first encounter with the Clause—
the law could have been justified under a variety of other powers. 
Moreover, Arjona provided little originalist support for its position, 
pointing only to the Neutrality Act, which as a post-ratification measure is 
not ideal support. Moreover, Arjona failed to confront the significant corpus 
of evidence suggesting that neutrality was not about offenses at all. The 
casualness of its broad holding greatly weakens its weight. 
Since Arjona, the Court has treated the Offenses power as more rigidly 
limiting punishable offenses. This is not surprising given that subsequent 
cases involved enemies tried in military tribunals. While their actions could 
easily have been law of nations crimes for the individual committing them, 
they did not implicate the responsibility of the United States, having been 
committed by foreign forces abroad or directly against U.S. forces. The 
commissions cases themselves do not necessarily depend on the Offenses 
Clause, having deep constitutional roots in various legislative and executive 
war powers. Thus, one might conclude that the Supreme Court’s Offenses 
jurisprudence has been sporadic, inconsistent, and not well developed. 
Given that, it would be hard to conclude that the case law has in any way 
reshaped the Offenses Clause from what it was at the Founding. Inquiries 
into its meaning must thus focus on the evidence developed in Part II. 
IV. DELEGATION: WHO DEFINES? 
Part III revealed some tension between the deferential approach of the 
principal Offenses Clause case, Arjona, and the much higher level of 
scrutiny in Hamdan. Arjona found no need for specific precedents to 
uphold a legislative definition. On the other hand, in Hamdan, the Court 
required a strict congruence with objectively ascertainable international 
law, indeed, the existence of a “plain and unambiguous” precedent for the 
offense. This Part shows that regardless of whether Arjona’s analysis can be 
questioned, the apparent inconsistency between the two cases is justified by 
major differences in the measures under review. In Arjona, Congress 
explicitly purported to define an international law offense. In Hamdan, the 
charged offense had not been defined by statute but by a military 
commission. Thus, Hamdan presents a question crucial for ATS 
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jurisprudence—what happens to the Offenses power when Congress 
legislates regarding offenses without defining them? 
Whatever the precise contours of Congress’s power, it did not actually 
define any in the ATS or the statute that had authorized the military 
commissions in Hamdan.318 Indeed, the Hamdan plurality opinion noted 
that Congress itself had not directly established the conspiracy crime 
involved in that case.319 The relevant statutes do not specify the content of—
or even identify by name—any law of nations norms. (In a milder version 
of this, the federal piracy law bans “piracy as defined by the law of nations” 
but does not explain what this consists of.)320 These laws leave all of the 
defining to the courts or to the Executive Branch, respectively.321 
These provisions raise questions about whether any special deference 
owed to congressional definitions persists when Congress delegates the 
defining to other branches. However, the delegation question is analytically 
distinct from the questions about the substantive scope of the Clause 
pursued in Parts II and III. One need not accept the analysis of Congress’s 
Offenses power developed herein for the purposes of this Part. Whatever 
the scope of Congress’s Offenses powers, their delegation can obviously be 
no broader. That is, if the Offenses Clause strictly limits Congress to well-
established international norms, other branches can go no further when 
delegated the power. Yet the delegated power can be narrower—even if 
Congress has special discretion in defining, this leeway may not be 
transferable. 
This Part will show that even assuming Congress has significant 
discretion in defining offenses, this discretion disappears when it fails to 
provide any definition but rather leaves the determination of international 
offenses to other branches. Two sets of reasons support this position. The 
first set involves the policies behind the Define Offenses Clause itself, 
including providing codified and clear regulations in place of the vagaries 
of international law and allowing the foreign relations aspects of 
international law to be given due regard. The second set of reasons involves 
the policies behind the so-called nondelegation doctrine.322 The ATS 
represents extraordinarily broad delegation of legislative powers. If such 
delegation is not limited by some intelligible principle, but instead further 
broadened by a notion of discretion—the idea that there is no standard 
 
318  See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“[A]lthough the 
constitutional text permits Congress to ‘define and punish,’ the ATCA punishes, but does not define.”). 
319  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 601–02 (2006). 
320  18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). 
321  See Swaine, supra note 13, at 1528–29 (discussing the ATS as a delegation of Offenses power 
that raises issues common to all delegations). 
322  This nondelegation discussion is based on the twentieth-century delegation jurisprudence rather 
than an originalist analysis. While restrictions on delegation may have originalist support, the point here 
is to show how restrictions on judicial definition are consistent with, and mandated by, even the 
relatively relaxed modern separation of powers doctrines. 
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against which a definition can be measured—it would go far beyond 
anything permitted even under the rather forgiving, modern separation of 
powers doctrine. 
A. Discretion and Defining 
1. The Concern over Common Law Crimes.—Recall that under the 
system proposed by Congress under the Articles of Confederation, state 
legislatures would define law of nations offenses.323 The Randolph report 
called for legislation because of the need for immediate action and for 
clarity about the United States’ ability to deal with its international 
obligations. However, the Randolph plan left the state courts, which 
exercised general common law powers, with a significant residual role in 
defining offenses. This arrangement was not surprising. The law of nations 
was seen as part of the common law; several international law offenses 
were already enforced through the common law in England.324 
In preliminary drafts of the Constitution, the Offenses power involved 
only “punishment” of offenses, with the definition presumably being left to 
the courts. Yet Congress was given the explicit power to define because of 
the perceived vagueness of international customary norms. Such uncertainty 
would be bad for defendants and for the national interest. The “vagueness” 
of the law of nations was seen as raising the kinds of problems related to 
common law crimes. (Similarly, Clause Ten gives Congress the define 
power over maritime felonies rather than giving such criminal common law 
powers directly to the courts, even though they retained civil common 
lawmaking powers in admiralty.) Indeed, all of Congress’s explicit criminal 
powers—treason, counterfeiting, and Clause Ten offenses—were specified 
because of doubts about the existence of a federal criminal common law. 
Thus, the vagueness concern that led to the define power can be better 
understood in light of the problems with common law crimes. 
The problems with common law crimes are twofold: the first involving 
individual rights and the second involving structural concerns. Individual 
rights concerns focus on notice and due process. Given the scope of the 
common law—and of modern international law—it would be hard for 
potential defendants to know in advance the rules that govern their conduct. 
However, the structural concerns about federal common law were even 
more salient in the Founding Era. 
Since the scope of the common law potentially extended to anything, 
the ability to fashion common law offenses would give federal courts 
jurisdiction beyond the limits clearly marked by Congress.325 Courts could 
 
323  See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
324  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68–71. 
325  See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812) (holding common law crimes 
unconstitutional). 
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give themselves jurisdiction by creating new causes of action. Worse yet, 
such jurisdiction could exceed not only the powers Congress had given, but 
also those it could give. In other words, the scope of common law crimes 
could exceed the scope of Article I legislative authority. The law of nations 
was regarded as part of the common law. Thus, the mischief that could 
result from allowing federal judges to create common law crimes could 
equally result from federal (common law) international crimes. The former 
was denounced by the Supreme Court as giving the federal judiciary an 
authority “much more extended—in its nature very indefinite—applicable 
to a great variety of subjects . . . and with regard to which there exists no 
definite criterion . . . .”326 This of course is the same vagueness shared by 
“Offences” that led to the addition of the define power at the Convention. 
St. George Tucker’s commentary took an extremely narrow view of 
permissible delegation under the Offenses Clause, which highlighted how 
concerns about federal common law crimes meant that courts could not 
“define” themselves. He asked rhetorically: 
Let us suppose again that congress having defined the offence of piracy, had 
omitted to declare the punishment; could the federal courts have supplied this 
omission by pronouncing such a sentence as they might suppose the crime 
deserved? Again, let us suppose that congress may have omitted altogether to 
define or to declare the punishment of any other offence committed upon the 
high seas; will it be contended that the federal courts could in any such case 
punish the offender, however atrocious his offence . . . ?327 
Tucker’s first example shows that a mere grant of jurisdiction would 
not be enough to give federal courts legislative power over offenses, even 
though such a grant could be read as implicit delegation. The ATS is closer 
to the second example—where Congress “omitted altogether to define” 
international offenses.328 To be sure, the ATS is not a criminal statute. The 
Offenses Clause’s punishing power encompasses civil liability.329 Yet when 
it comes to Congress’s ability to define offenses, it would be odd and 
incongruous to vary its scope depending on whether criminal or civil 
penalties were applied since the Offenses Clause itself does not distinguish 
between criminal and civil actions.330 The central requirement of defining 
comes from the Constitution, although the need for such definition may be 
particularly acute in criminal matters. Thus, the limits on judicially created 
offenses related to common law crimes apply even in the case of the ATS. 
 
326  Id. 
327  Tucker, Cognizance, supra note 121, at 398–99. 
328  The fact that Tucker does not mention the ATS as an example of such a statute could suggest 
that he did not see it as creating causes of action but simply conferring jurisdiction, the position 
ultimately sort of rejected in Sosa. 
329  See Stephens, supra note 23, at 504–08. 
330  See id. at 508–09. That is to say, the power to define applies equally to all kinds of offenses. 
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2. Foreign Policy Concerns.—Choosing what norms to recognize as 
customary international law implicates America’s obligations to other 
countries and raises a variety of foreign relations and diplomatic questions. 
The positions taken by the United States on the content of international law 
will in turn shape the external development of that law in ways that bind the 
United States. Thus, defining offenses can involve high questions of 
statecraft. The vagueness of international law is relevant here too. The law 
of nations is much more intertwined with politics than most of the common 
law; one need not take the extreme position that there is no international 
law to concede that international legal determinations have a sizable 
political component. 
The vagueness of international law leaves an unusual degree of room 
for politically guided judgments. The Framers understood that there was a 
difference between “existing law of nations”331 and “novelties or pretensions 
of equivocal validity.”332 These considerations explain why the Offenses 
power is given, in the first instance, to Congress, despite the judiciary’s 
presumptive role of saying “what the law is.”333 Congress’s involvement in 
foreign relations gives it both special expertise and additional authority. 
If “define” means Congress must adhere rigidly to external 
international law, obviously it cannot give the courts more creative power 
than it itself constitutionally possesses. Yet if “define” implies that the 
courts must give Congress’s definitions some deference, this is incoherent 
when the define power is delegated. What would it mean for courts to give 
deference to their own definitions? That would not be deference but simply 
agreeing with oneself. 
All of this suggests that delegated exercises of the Offenses power 
must hew more closely to well-established, objective international law than 
Congress would. Whatever latitude the define power gives Congress, it 
does not support any deference to definitions provided by other branches 
exercising a delegated power. Indeed, of the two other branches, the courts, 
not being involved in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, should 
enjoy the least deference. 
B. Delegation and Defining. 
1. The Supreme Court on Delegated “Defining”.—The seminal 
Supreme Court case United States v. Smith upheld some delegation of the 
parallel power to define piracy, but also suggested limits on such 
 
331  Letter from John Jay to Edmund Randolph (Nov. 19, 1794), in 4 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND 
PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 137, 142–43 (Henry P. Johnston ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 
1893) (distinguishing between the “existing law of nations” and other norms). 
332  HAMILTON, Camillus No. XXXI, supra note 56, at 462. 
333  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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delegations.334 Smith involved a statute proscribing the death penalty for 
those convicted of “piracy, as defined by the law of nations.”335 The 
defendant argued that Congress had failed to exercise its power to define 
piracy. The defendant maintained that because the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to define and punish piracy, it cannot simply punish 
without defining. A statute that simply creates a crime of “piracy,” the same 
term used in the Constitution, does not define, it just recapitulates. 
The Court rejected the argument as applied to piracy. But the reasoning 
suggests that argument would have been valid for “felonies” and “offences 
against the law of nations.” Justice Story distinguished piracy, which had a 
specific and well-established definition with well-known elements, from the 
broader categories of felonies and offenses. Echoing the discussions at the 
Constitutional Convention, he suggested that the congressional exercise of 
the define power with respect to piracy was unnecessary because everyone 
knew what piracy meant336: “Congress may as well define by using a term 
of a known and determinate meaning, as by an express enumeration of all 
the particulars included in that term.”337 Indeed, piracy stands out from the 
Clause Ten enumeration as the only specified crime, rather than a category 
of crimes.338 Story maintained that the real purpose of the define power was 
in relation to felonies on the high seas and “offences against the law of 
nations”: 
Offences . . . cannot, with any accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained 
and defined in any public code recognised by the common consent of nations. 
In respect, therefore, as well to felonies on the high seas as to offences against 
the law of nations, there is a peculiar fitness in giving the power to define as 
well as to punish . . . .339 
Thus, Smith suggests that unlike with piracy, claims of inadequate 
definition (improper delegation) could be valid against a statute that 
purported to exercise the felonies or Offenses power but did no more to 
define than reflexively refer to the law of nations. Certainly the law of 
nations, unlike piracy, is far from self-defining; this was the rationale for 
giving Congress the define power in the first place. And today’s customary 
 
334  The Court rejected the argument “that Congress is bound to define, in terms, the offence of 
piracy, and is not at liberty to leave it to be ascertained by judicial interpretation.” United States v. 
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820). 
335  Id. at 157. 
336  Id. at 158, 160–61 (“[T]he definition of piracies might have been left without inconvenience to 
the law of nations . . . . [T]he crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with reasonable 
certainty . . . . There is scarcely a writer on the law of nations, who does not allude to piracy as a crime 
of a settled and determinate nature . . . .”). 
337  Id. at 159 (emphasis added). 
338  This does not mean the power to define piracy was an empty one. It could involve subsidiary 
issues like secondary liability and affirmative defenses. 
339  Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 159. 
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international law is far broader and messier still.340 On this point, the 
dissenting Justice Livingstone agreed341 and spelled it out more clearly: 
By the same clause of the constitution, Congress have power to punish 
offences against the law of nations, and yet it would hardly be deemed a fair 
and legitimate execution of this authority, to declare, that all offences against 
the law of nations, without defining any one of them, should be punished with 
death.342 
The ATS is precisely the kind of statute described by Justice 
Livingston.343 To be sure, Smith was a criminal case with capital 
punishment mandated for the offense—a point stressed by the dissent.344 In 
this context, an open delegation to the courts would magnify concerns 
associated with statutory vagueness and common law crimes.345 The Court’s 
recent narrow reading of a delegated defining to military commissions also 
involved high-stakes punitive proceedings.346 The ATS, which provides 
only civil remedies, does not raise these concerns. Yet the nondelegation 
doctrine applies in full to civil laws, and Smith’s argument is at bottom a 
nondelegation one. 
2. The Modern (Weak) Nondelegation Doctrine.—The delegation of 
legislative power to the branches that will interpret and administer the law 
is inevitable. In the twentieth century, as regulatory aims became 
increasingly complex and fact dependent, Congress delegated rulemaking 
powers increasingly broadly. And these very broad delegations of other 
Article I powers have been sustained by the Supreme Court.347 Famously, 
no statute has been struck down on delegation grounds since the New 
Deal,348 leading many commentators to doubt the vitality of the 
nondelegation doctrine. Yet the Court has in recent years reaffirmed the 
existence of a rather relaxed nondelegation rule. Congress can delegate so 
 
340  As one court put it in an ATS case, international law “means many things to many people.” 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
341  Indeed, the difference between the majority and the dissent in Smith is that the latter did not 
think piracy could be distinguished enough from the broader category of offenses, while the majority, 
though apparently agreeing that a blanket delegation of power to define offenses would be problematic, 
thought that this did not apply to piracy, which was a self-contained offense. 
342  Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 183 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
343  It is noteworthy that Justice Livingston did not mention the ATS, suggesting he may not have 
seen it as delegating any power to create causes of action. 
344  Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 164, 183 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
345  While the vagueness doctrine is a product of modern jurisprudence, Smith was decided at a time 
when the debate over federal common law crimes was still fresh. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
346  See Vladeck, supra note 11 (suggesting that discretion to define offenses should be narrower in 
the criminal context). 
347  See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1721, 1723 (2002). 
348  Id. 
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long as it provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the agent’s 
discretion.349 The intelligible principle is a nucleus of policy determination 
that at least determines the basic direction of further action, establishes 
some parameters that give the ultimate regulation the imprimatur of the 
legislature, and distinguishes the law from a pure handover of power.350 
Such an intelligible principle could be simply a “broad general directive[],” 
a “general policy . . . and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”351 
The ATS lacks any intelligible principle to cabin the courts’ discretion. 
The nondelegation doctrine is weak because the Supreme Court has held 
that it does not take much congressional guidance to constitute an 
intelligible principle.352 At the height of post-New Deal jurisprudence, even 
an instruction to be “fair” or “reasonable” could suffice.353 Yet the ATS 
does not have even this fig leaf guidance. Indeed, the ATS represents the 
broadest delegation of Offenses Clause powers, apparently encompassing 
all law of nations violations, provided the lawsuit is brought in tort.354 (The 
ATS speaks of “violations” of the law of nations rather than “offenses,” but 
it does not appear to have been argued that the former is a narrower term.) 
The authority of military commissions may be narrower, as it extends only 
to offenses traditionally recognized by the laws of war, a subset of the law 
of nations. 
In the ATS, the subject matter of the delegation is as broad as the 
Offenses Clause itself. It is as if Congress had passed a law telling the 
judiciary to “regulate commerce” or the Executive to “declare war.” The 
only limits (aliens, torts) are jurisdictional, not substantive; there is no 
policy determination at all in the statute. Congress has not specified any 
particular offenses or even kinds of offenses, let alone their elements, that 
can serve as a basis for liability under the statute. Rather, Congress has left 
all of the defining to the judiciary. 
3. The Sosa Standard as the ATS’s “Intelligible Principle”.—All of 
these problems could have been avoided if the Supreme Court in Sosa had 
interpreted the ATS, as the defendants urged, as a purely jurisdictional 
statute.355 Yet while Sosa sets up the ATS as a serious delegation problem, it 
 
349  J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
350  See id. at 406. 
351  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989). 
352  See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 258 (2010). 
353  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373–74, 378. 
354  While courts and commentators generally treat “tort” as simply referring to civil remedies, Bellia 
and Clark see the “tort” as carving out a very specific subset of international law norms, and thus 
narrowly limiting courts’ discretion. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 71, at 518 (arguing that the 
historical context of the ATS suggests that “tort” referred “only [to] intentional acts of force or violence 
by US citizens against alien friends”). 
355  See supra text accompanying notes 37–40. 
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also provides the solution by providing a narrowing construction of the 
statute that saves it from the dangers of overdelegation—a typical tactic of 
modern courts.356 And aside from nondelegation concerns, even statutes that 
explicitly parallel a constitutional provision can be interpreted more 
narrowly when Congress’s policy intentions are unclear.357 Sosa interprets 
the ATS’s delegation as being much narrower than all offenses. Rather, the 
Sosa Court emphasized that federal courts can only entertain ATS suits for 
a subset of international norms: “[F]ederal courts should not recognize 
private claims under federal common law for violations of any international 
law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations 
than the historical paradigms familiar when [the statute] was enacted.”358 
In requiring offenses to be definite and comparable to the three historic 
models, Sosa provides the kind of intelligible standard that saves a statute 
from nondelegation problems. Indeed, Sosa specifically framed its warning 
about recognizing novel causes of action as being about the scope of 
Congress’s implicit common law delegation to the Court. As the Court put 
it, “We have no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and 
debatable violations of the law of nations . . . .”359 Of course, as we have 
seen, Congress may not have been able to give the courts such a mandate 
even if it wanted to because such a delegation would exceed the 
constitutional limits of the Offenses power. 
C. Sosa on Steroids 
1. The Offenses Clause as a Limit on ATS Causes of Action.—It 
should now be clear that Sosa’s requirement of “definite” norms echoes the 
“define” aspect that Congress failed to provide. In effect, Sosa stated that 
courts cannot define their own offenses under the ATS in the absence of 
congressional definitions.360 They can only take those offenses that are 
predefined in international law. It is thus instructive that in calling for 
definite norms, Sosa specifically cites Smith—a case about the 
constitutional limits of the define power—to illustrate the specificity with 
which ATS causes of action must be defined in international law.361 After 
 
356  See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 224. 
357  See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631–33 (1818); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
358  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). Since then, scholars and courts have 
divided on whether this standard was supposed to raise the bar for ATS lawsuits or to justify prior 
permissive practice. See supra text accompanying notes 40–41. 
359  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (emphasis added). 
360  This is not reading more into Sosa than could have been there: the issue of the separation of 
powers under the Offenses Clause had been argued to the Court. See Brief for the United States as 
Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 32–36, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339) (describing the assertion 
of private rights of action under the ATCA as usurping Congress’s define and punish authority). 
361  See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
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all, Smith said that piracy was uniquely so self-defined that it alone could be 
punished by the courts without any further definition by Congress. The 
status and definition of piracy was not just something some scholars and 
legal sources indicated, but one on which there was universal agreement. 
Had there been less than that, Congress’s delegation of defining authority to 
the courts may well have been inadequate. 
Sosa nominally bases its conclusions on a reconstruction of the intent 
of the First Congress in enacting the statute. This Part has shown that 
Sosa’s standard is independent of presumed legislative intent: it is 
mandated by the Offenses Clause and nondelegation concepts. The 
constitutional underpinnings of Sosa’s rule mean that refusing to recognize 
fuzzy, emerging, or not universally accepted offenses is more than an 
implementation of congressional intent or a prudent policy. Rather, Sosa’s 
caution may be the kind of caution courts must exercise when there is a 
danger of construing a statute in a way that would raise constitutional 
concerns.362 
Recall that the three common law offenses were not the only ones the 
First Congress could imagine.363 The congressional report of 1781 
recommended that state legislatures pass laws against the three offenses 
identified in Sosa, with the state courts left to deal with the very real but 
less obvious ones. Thus, under the Articles of Confederation, state courts 
could do some defining themselves. 
Moreover, the “definite” norms set up as a standard in Sosa were the 
very same ones that the First Congress itself used the Offenses power to 
criminalize, thus providing a legislative definition. By establishing an 
intelligible principle equated to the classic common law offenses of the 
1780s rather than ones that courts might from time to time recognize and 
define, Sosa may read any substantial judicial defining role out of the ATS. 
None of these offenses would have required courts to define an offense that 
had not been already defined by Congress. That is, the norms Sosa referred 
to were the ones that were legislatively defined as crimes, to which the ATS 
could provide a civil supplement. This matches the model for supplemental 
civil remedies suggested by the Randolph report. 
2. Implications for ATS Cases.—This Part has shown that regardless 
of what Congress’s power is under the Offenses Clause, the courts 
themselves can define only those offenses most clearly established in 
international law when delegated the power by Congress. (If this sounds 
like the Sosa test for ATS actions, it is, but with a constitutional 
 
362  See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such 
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). 
363  See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. 
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dimension.) The ATS represents such a delegation, but it lacks a substantive 
limiting principle. Sosa suggests such a principle. While Sosa is, at its core, 
a statutory interpretation case, the interpretation was necessary to avoid 
serious constitutional difficulties. 
This has potentially significant implications for ATS suits. These suits 
have invoked an increasingly broad set of international norms of increasing 
nonobviousness and indefiniteness. When the suitability of a cause of action 
under the Sosa standard is questionable, doubts must be resolved in favor of 
caution. This is because the question of definiteness implicates not just the 
Court’s recent interpretation of the ATS, but also the limits on federal 
legislative authority and the separation of powers. 
A full analysis of whether any particular norm is as definite and 
universal as piracy or assaults on ambassadors is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Yet the Court has given a template for analyzing these issues, most 
recently in Hamdan. To satisfy the Offenses Clause, an offense defined 
solely by the courts would have to meet the same kind of searching scrutiny 
given the conspiracy charge in Hamdan. It would have to be shown, to 
begin with, that the same conduct has in fact been punished by other nations 
or international tribunals as an offense against the law of nations. Finally, 
one might briefly suggest recent ATS cases that have sustained causes of 
action for violations of purported international laws that may be “novelties 
or pretensions of equivocal validity.”364 These include the alleged 
international offenses of child labor,365 forced labor,366 cruel and degrading 
treatment,367 pharmaceutical testing,368 sex tourism,369 and apartheid.370 Such 
cases often fail to identify a single judicial precedent for liability. 
 
364  See supra note 332. 
365  Compare Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1021–22 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (holding 
that “paid labor of very young children in these heavy and hazardous jobs” in violation of international 
labor standards was actionable under the ATS), with Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 
1013, 1022–24 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (holding that court is unable to “distill a crisp rule” from 
international conventions on individual liability, and noting lack of “concrete evidence” on imposition of 
liability by other nations). 
366  See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
367  See id. at 1077 (noting that courts treat cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment as an actionable 
ATS offense despite disagreement as to what constitutes such treatment). 
368  See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174–82 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that involuntary 
medical testing constituted a definite and universal violation). 
369  See M.C. v. Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d 127, 132–33 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that sexual assault 
against minors by a private individual in the context of sex tourism gives rise to an ATS cause of 
action). 
370  See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We assume, without deciding, 
that a claim akin to apartheid would be cognizable under the ATS . . . .”); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l 
Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (vacating the dismissal of ATS claims for aiding and 
abetting apartheid); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
Despite efforts to criminalize apartheid and give it legal status in the United States, a treaty to that effect 
has not received the assent of the vast majority of nations, including the United States. See 
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Perhaps the most active issues in ATS litigation involve not the 
substantive definition of the crime, but second-order questions.371 The most 
contentious of these go to the scope of secondary liability372—issues 
involving corporate liability373 and liability for aiding and abetting.374 Yet 
answering these questions first requires determining where to look. In one 
view, only the primary conduct—the elements of the offense—comes from 
international law; all subsidiary questions would be decided by federal 
common law or some other noninternational source, as in Bivens cases.375 In 
the other view, at least all matters required to establish liability (like the 
possibility of corporate culpability) are determined by international law. 
Under a broader version of this position, all questions, even those posterior 
to liability like punitive damages, derive from international law. 
The analysis of this Article does not answer these questions. It shows 
that these are not simply questions about the ATS—rather, they potentially 
implicate the Offenses Clause. If the ATS does require courts to take these 
definitions from international law, the Offenses Clause would presumably 
require the same clarity and definiteness for “secondary principles” which 
in effect determine liability as for norms of primary conduct. For it is the 
existence of liability that is characteristic of offenses, and those offenses 
that are against “the law of nations” are primarily for Congress to define. 
CONCLUSION 
As Congress increasingly legislates under the Offenses Clause, 
understanding the limits of that power has become more important than 
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 reporters’ note 1 
(1987), note; United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/ 
Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-7.en.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). It has been criminalized in the 
charter of the International Criminal Court, though subsequent to the conduct involved in the ATS 
litigation. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(j), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90, 93. 
371  Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1931, 1931–32 (2010). 
372  See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 257–59 (2d Cir. 
2009); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 288 (Hall, J., concurring). 
373  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 129 (2d Cir. 2010), cert granted, 132 
S. Ct. 472 (2011); Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: 
A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353 (2011). 
374  See, e.g., Sarei, 671 F.3d at 765–66 (holding that international law establishes aiding and 
abetting liability for war crimes). 
375  See, e.g., Wuerth, supra note 371 at 1933–34. Yet, it seems clear that in ATS cases, at least 
some issues aside from the prima facie elements of the crime must be governed by international law, 
such as the question of universal jurisdiction. See supra note 57. Moreover, saying that subsidiary 
questions should be decided by federal common law does not rule out borrowing from the law of nations 
in making the common law rule, which would again force a court to confront definitional questions. 
Indeed, this may make sense for reasons of international comity and to prevent forum shopping. 
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ever. Yet there is little understanding of how broad a power the Constitution 
grants with the word “define” or what amounts to “offenses.” This Article 
has examined the available evidence as to the Clause’s meaning, drawn 
from an examination of the purposes and precursors of the Clause, its path 
through the Convention and subsequent treatment by early Congresses, the 
views of those few Framers and early jurists who addressed the matter, and 
early judicial interpretations of the cognate “define . . . Piracies and 
Felonies committed on the high Seas.” These sources, while thinner than for 
most constitutional provisions, suggest that exercises of the power cannot 
be appreciably broader than established international law offenses. 
Congress cannot legislate beyond a reasonable interpretation of 
international law. Furthermore, “Offences” does not refer to any conduct 
with international legal, or even merely diplomatic, effects. Rather, it refers 
to conduct that international law deems individually wrongful. 
The Offenses power presumes Congress will define the offenses it 
makes actionable. Yet it has repeatedly delegated authority to the courts to 
identify and define offenses within certain broad categories, such as war 
crimes or torts. Such delegations are not inherently illegitimate. Yet when 
the courts go about defining such offenses, they can certainly not exercise 
more creativity than Congress could have if it had done the defining. Thus, 
if Congress can only define existing offenses, the courts can only define 
some subset, such as very well-accepted offenses with noncontroversial 
definitions. Even if Congress has broader discretion than suggested in this 
Article, the delegated define power of the courts will have to be narrower to 
avoid separation of powers concerns. This conclusion echoes the standard 
the Sosa Court laid down for ATS offenses but gives it constitutional 
resonance. 
Finally, it would be naïve to suggest that any understanding of the 
Offenses power would often be outcome determinative. A narrow view of 
the Offenses power simply shifts the debate to whether the purported norm 
truly exists in international law. Definiteness and concreteness are hard to 
quantify. Because international offenses never come with internationally 
issued certificates of authenticity,376 even if the Offenses Clause were 
understood to only allow the creation of most well-established offenses, 
there will often be room to argue that the norm in question is well-
established. 
 
376  Crimes created by treaty may be an exception, but those can be legislated under the treaty power. 
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